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WT/TPR/G/200
5 May 2008

(08-2086)

Trade Policy Review Body Original: English







TRADE POLICY REVIEW

Report by

UNITED STATES




Pursuant to the Agreement Establishing the Trade Policy Review Mechanism (Annex 3 of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization), the policy statement by United States is attached.


Note: This report is subject to restricted circulation and press embargo until the end of the first session of the meeting of the Trade Policy Review Body on United States.

CONTENTS
Page
I. THE UNITED STATES IN THE MULTILATERAL SYSTEM 5
(1) OVERVIEW 5
II. THE UNITED STATES ECONOMIC AND TRADE ENVIRONMENT 7
(i) Trade policy 7
(ii) Growth 7
(iii) Federal Budget Deficit 8
(iv) Saving 8
(v) Labor Markets 8
(vi) Productivity 8
(vii) Exports, Imports, and Trade Balance 9
(viii) Recent Challenges to the U.S. Economy 9
(ix) Conclusion 10
III. OPENNESS AND ACCOUNTABILITY: BUILDING SUPPORT FOR TRADE 10
(i) The U.S. System 10
IV. TRADE POLICY DEVELOPMENTS SINCE 2006 12
(1) WTO AGREEMENTS AND INITIATIVES 12
(i) The Doha Development Agenda 12
(ii) Implementation of Existing Agreements 13
(2) REGIONAL INITIATIVES 13
(i) North American Free Trade Agreement 14
(ii) Free Trade Area of the Americas Negotiations 14
(iii) Central America and the Dominican Republic 15
(iv) Southern African Customs Union Free Trade Agreement Negotiations 15
(v) Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum 15
(vi) The Enterprise for ASEAN Initiative (EAI) 16
(vii) Middle East Free Trade Area (MEFTA) 16
(viii) Enhancing Transatlantic Economic Relations 16
(ix) African Growth and Opportunity Act 17
(x) The Caribbean Basin Initiative 18
(xi) Andean Trade Preference Act 18
(3) BILATERAL FREE TRADE AGREEMENS (FTAS) 19
(i) United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement 19
(ii) United States-Singapore Free Trade Agreement 19
(iii) United States-Jordan Free Trade Agreement 19
(iv) United States-Israel Free Trade Agreement 19
(v) United States-Australia Free Trade Agreement 20
(vi) United States-Morocco Free Trade Agreement 20
(vii) United States-Bahrain Free Trade Agreement 20

Page

(viii) United States-Thailand Free Trade Agreement Negotiations 20
(ix) United States-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement 21
(x) United States-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement 21
(xi) United States-Panama Free Trade Agreement 21
(xii) United States-Oman Free Trade Agreement 21
(xiii) United States-Korea Free Trade Agreement 22
(xiv) United States-Malaysia Free Trade Agreement Negotiations 22
V. TRADE-RELATED CAPACITY BUILDING INITIATIVES 22
VI. LEGISLATIVE AGENDA 24
VII. LABOR ISSUES 24
VIII. ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES 25
IX. LOOKING FORWARD 26

ANNEX I: U.S. SUBMISSIONS TO THE WTO IN SUPPORT OF THE
DOHA DEVELOPMENT AGENDA 28


I. THE UNITED STATES IN THE MULTILATERAL SYSTEM
(1) OVERVIEW
1. The United States remains firmly committed to the World Trade Organization as the embodiment of the open, transparent, rules-based multilateral trading system. As the U.S Government undergoes its ninth Trade Policy Review, and as an active participant in the Trade Policy Review Mechanism, the United States steadfastly believes that transparency is a key component of robust world trade. As a key architect of the post-World War II trading system and a leader in the pursuit of successive trade-liberalizing rounds of trade negotiations, the United States shares a common purpose with our WTO partners: expanding economic opportunities for the world’s citizens by reducing trade barriers. The Doha Development Agenda (DDA) is the ninth successive round of multilateral trade negotiations to be carried out since the end of World War II.
2. As 2008 begins to unfold, the Doha negotiations face another critical juncture. Concluding an ambitious Doha Round is President Bush’s top trade negotiating priority as a means to generate economic growth through meaningful new trade flows in agriculture, industrial goods and services - helping to lift millions of people in developing countries out of poverty. Along with the day-to-day implementation of the rules governing world trade, the DDA negotiations reflect the imperative of continued multilateral trade liberalization as part of the foundation that ensures stability and growth in a dynamic world economy. The Administration realizes that a window of opportunity exists to conclude the Doha Round in 2008 and looks forward to working with our trading partners to achieve the ambitious and balanced outcome that will be necessary for a successful agreement.
3. The fundamental features of U.S. trade policy -- maintenance of an open, competitive market at home, compliance with WTO obligations, and leadership in the multilateral trading system -- are unchanged despite new challenges presented by a dynamic, global economy. Over the period of review, rapidly expanding exports were an important factor in the strong economic growth experienced by the U.S. economy, while strong U.S. import growth contributed to the export expansion of U.S. foreign trade partners around the globe. As we confront an economic slowdown brought about by challenges in the housing and credit markets, traditional drivers of growth such as consumption and investment are being adversely affected. In this environment, strong export growth is playing an important role in supporting the U.S. economy. In 2007, U.S. exports of goods and services accounted for 42 percent of overall U.S. GDP growth. If the United States is to be successful in ensuring economic growth for the long-term, an open trade policy that supports faster growing exports will play a prominent role. The United States needs open markets around the world to withstand protectionist pressures at home and to sustain the economic arguments at the core of our sixty-year old, bipartisan, open trade policy.
4. USTR continues to consult closely with the Congress, including on the WTO Doha Development Agenda and on legislation intended to bring the United States into compliance with adverse WTO rulings.
5. The Administration worked with congressional leaders to achieve the Bipartisan Agreement on Trade Policy of May 10, 2007. The strong bipartisan votes in the House and Senate in support of the Peru Trade Promotion Agreement in late 2007 marked the first step in realizing the promise of the May 10th agreement. The Administration is engaged with Congress to achieve the same success with respect to Colombia, Panama, and Korea free trade agreements. The Administration also worked with Congress to reauthorize the Andean Trade Preference Act. The Administration is committed to working with Congress to advance a pro-trade agenda that promotes economic prosperity and by addressing the changes and disruptions that can follow from increased globalization.
6. Private sector advice is both a critical and integral part of the trade policy process. USTR maintains an ongoing dialogue with interested private sector parties on trade agenda issues. The advisory committee system is unique since the committees meet on a regular basis and receive sensitive information about ongoing trade negotiations and other trade policy issues and developments. Committee members are required to have a national security clearance.
7. The 28 U.S. advisory committees provide information and advice with respect to U.S. negotiating objectives and bargaining positions before the Government enters into trade agreements, on the operation of any trade agreement once entered into, and on other matters arising in connection with the development, implementation, and administration of U.S. trade policy.
8. The Administration is convinced that the United States must continue to pursue the economic policies of the last six decades which have produced an exceptionally diverse, innovative, productive, open and prosperous economy. The pursuit of these policies – embraced by Republican and Democratic Administrations and Congresses alike – has created a strong foundation on which to build prosperity and freedom for future generations.
9. The Administration is addressing the employment disruptions directly attributable to trade policy. Together with Congress, the President has pledged to work to improve the Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) program and help trade-affected workers and farmers access the reemployment services and training they need to return to work quickly. TAA reform would complement the President‘s American Competitiveness Initiative, which is designed to ensure U.S. competitiveness in innovation through investment that strengthens education and encourages entrepreneurship, and research and development.
10. As part of its broader efforts to liberalize trade, and still within the scope of WTO rules, the United States is pursuing regional and bilateral initiatives for free trade areas. The U.S. view that regional and bilateral agreements can act as an incubator and catalyst for multilateral liberalization is not new. Between 1934 and 1945, the United States entered into thirty-two reciprocal trade agreements, many of which had clauses that foreshadowed those currently in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Since then, U.S. agreements have built on existing WTO commitments, and pushed for more. For example, U.S. agreements provide duty- free, quota free access for nearly all imports from its partners; they reaffirm WTO disciplines and increase IPR protection; they solidify and expand trade facilitation measures; and they introduce labor and environmental protection standards. Overall, U.S. bilateral and regional agreements appear to be adding momentum to global trade liberalization, fostering trade and economic growth, and stimulating our FTA partners to greater participation in the WTO.
11. Integral to the Administration’s goal of accelerating growth and economic reform in the developing world and, most importantly, in its poorest regions, are the four U.S. preference programs (the Generalized System of Preferences, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), the Caribbean Basin Initiative, and the Andean Trade Preference Act) through which eligible products enter the United States duty-free from 131 beneficiary developing countries. In 2007, the Administration also worked to implement enhancements to AGOA that were granted to lesser-developed countries by the Africa Investment Incentive Act (AIIA), which President Bush signed on December 20, 2006.
12. Trade capacity building (TCB) is a critical part of the United States’ strategy to help developing countries to implement and take advantage of market-opening and reform-oriented trade agreements. The United States remains committed to assisting developing countries build up their capacity by providing trade capacity building assistance or aid for trade. The further integration of developing countries into the multilateral trading system is a high priority for the United States, including the development and implementation of trade policies founded on the WTO Agreements. Total U.S. funding for TCB activities from 2001 to 2007 was approximately $7.1 billion. The United States has and will continue to support the WTO’s role in aid for trade as well as the Enhanced Integrated Framework that aims to help the least trade-active countries participate in the global trading system.
13. The United States’ efforts build on its long-standing commitment to help all countries benefit from the global trading system, including through mechanisms such as the Enhanced Integrated Framework and the Millennium Challenge Corporation; contributions to the WTO=s Global Trust Fund for Trade-Related Technical Assistance; assistance to countries acceding to the WTO; targeted assistance for developing countries participating in U.S. preference programs, such as the $200 million African Global Competitiveness Initiative helping Africa benefit from AGOA; coordination of assistance through Trade and Investment Framework Agreements (TIFAs); TCB working groups that are integral elements of free trade negotiations; and Committees on TCB created to aid in the implementation of a number of FTAs, including the FTAs with the Dominican Republic and Central America, and Peru. Similar committees will also aid in the implementation of FTAs with Colombia and Panama as those enter into force. Other TCB assistance includes helping developing countries work with the private sector and non-governmental organizations, to transition to more open economies, prepare for FTA and WTO negotiations and implement their trade obligations.
14. An important element of U.S. support for the multilateral system is the recognition that the system, including the WTO, is a work in progress. Members, therefore, must take responsibility for important institutional improvements. The United States will continue to press for increased transparency in WTO operations, in WTO negotiations and in Members’ trade policies.
II. THE UNITED STATES ECONOMIC AND TRADE ENVIRONMENT
(i) Trade policy
15. The Administration believes that the more integrated global economy of the 21st century offers unparalleled economic opportunities for the United States and its trading partners. Open markets at home and free trade have made possible the American dream. With 95 percent of the world’s people living outside the United States, the Administration is committed to negotiating trade agreements, both multilateral and bilateral, that open foreign markets to the manufactured goods, services and agricultural products that Americans produce so well. Exports now support one in six manufacturing jobs. Imports have lowered costs and increased choices for American consumers.
16. The current U.S. simple average tariff is 3.5 percent on a legally bound basis under the WTO. When GSP and other preferences are taken into account, the U.S. trade weighted average tariff is just 1.3 percent on an applied basis. Last year nearly 70 percent of all U.S. imports (including under preference programs) entered the United States duty free. U.S. service markets are open to foreign providers and U.S. regulatory processes are transparent and accessible to the public.
(ii) Growth
17. The real gross domestic product (GDP) of the United States advanced 2.9 percent in 2006 and 2.2 percent in 2007, compared to an average annual rate of 3.4 percent in 2004 and 2005. This slower growth reflected a nearly 21 percent decline in the construction of residential structures. In fact, declining housing investment alone is sufficient to account fully for the GDP growth slow down between 2004-2005 and 2006-2007. Non-residential fixed investment in the U.S. economy remained strong at an average annual rate of 5.7 percent in 2006-2007, compared to 6.4 percent in 2004-2005. Personal consumption expenditures, which account for over two thirds of U.S. GDP, weakened only slightly, from an annual average growth rate of 3.4 percent in 2004-2005 to 3.0 percent in 2006-2007. The growth of government expenditures for both consumption and investment picked up, from an annual average of 1.1 percent in 2004-2005 to 1.9 percent in 2006-2007. Also, the average annual increase in real exports of goods and services in 2006-2007 was 8.2 percent, comparable to the 8.3 percent annual average increase in 2004-2005. Export expansion accounted for 32 percent of U.S. GDP growth in 2006 and 42 percent in 2007. At the same time, domestic price inflation declined slightly with the implicit price deflator for overall GDP decreasing from an annual average of 3.1 percent in 2004-2005 to 2.9 percent in 2006-2007.
(iii) Federal Budget Deficit
18. The federal budget deficit continued to fall from the preceding period of review through the current period of review. The budget deficit equalled 3.5 percent of GDP in 2004, 2.6 percent in 2005, 1.9 percent in 2006 and 1.2 percent in 2007. Sustained economic growth contributed to faster growth of federal government receipts (average of 9.2 percent per year in 2006 and 2007) than in federal government outlays (corresponding annual average of 5.1 percent) during the period of review.
(iv) Saving
19. U.S. gross saving declined as a percentage of gross national income from a recent peak of just over 18 percent in 1998 to 13.3 percent in 2007, the recent low. Under the period of review, saving as a share of income reached 14.1 percent in 2006, falling back to 13.3 percent in 2007. With levels of gross domestic investment in the U.S. economy far in excess of U.S. saving, large net inflows of foreign capital occurred, amounting, under national income and product definitions, to $624 billion in 2004, $735 billion in 2005, $794 billion in 2006, declining to $711 billion in 2007. The short fall between gross saving and gross domestic investment has reflected in part falling levels of personal saving out of current income. In the opening years of the last decade, for example, the personal saving rate was in excess of 5 percent of gross national income. Personal saving as a share of gross national income was just 0.3 percent in 2006 and 2007. These recent rates compare to shares of 1.6 percent in 2004 and 0.4 percent in 2005. The further fall in personal saving rates from the preceding to the current period of review was, however, roughly offset by increased corporate profits and reduced government budget deficits.
(v) Labor Markets
20. Employment growth continued in the United States over the period under review. The economy added nearly 2.4 million net new non-farm jobs in 2006 and over 1.5 million in 2007 to an average level of 137.6 million. The unemployment rate averaged 5.1 percent in 2005, easing to an average of 4.6 percent in 2006 and 2007. In 2006 and 2007, U.S. manufacturing employment declined by 342,000 to an average level of 13.9 million. Manufacturing now represents slightly more than one in ten U.S. non-farm jobs. Service-producing industries employed 84 percent of all U.S. non-farm workers in 2007.
(vi) Productivity
21. Labor productivity continued to grow at a faster rate than during the 1970’s and 1980’s. For the business sector overall, labor productivity grew at an average annual rate of almost 1.9 percent in 2006 and 2007 (fourth quarter to fourth quarter comparison). For the manufacturing sector, output per hour worked grew at a considerably faster rate, 3.9 percent annually over the two years. The rapid rates of labor productivity growth in manufacturing have likely contributed to the reduction in overall manufacturing employment in the United States. Even as manufacturing employment declined, real output of the U.S. manufacturing sector grew at an average annual rate of 3.5 percent a year in 2006 and 2007.
22. Increasing labor productivity is a central factor underlying improvements in incomes and the material standard of living. Inflation adjusted hourly labor compensation rose at an annual average rate of 1.5 percent over the two years 2006-2007. Many factors could be mentioned to help account for the U.S.-productivity growth improvements since the mid-1990s, most notably technological advances. The United States considers that more open markets and the WTO-based global trading system have contributed importantly to competition in the U.S. market, the shift of employment expansion to more productive jobs and to the overall success of the U.S. economy.
(vii) Exports, Imports, and Trade Balance
23. U.S. trade continued to expand during the period under review. In 2006 and 2007, real exports of goods and services grew at an average annual rate of 8.2 percent while U.S. real imports of goods and services grew at a 3.9 percent annual rate. As a share of nominal GDP, goods and services exports rose from 10.5 percent in 2005 to 11.9 percent in 2007, while imports of goods and services rose from 16.3 percent in 2005 to 17.0 percent in 2007. Import prices rose faster than export prices, with the implicit price deflator rising at an annual average of 3.5 percent for exports and 3.8 percent for imports.
24. As a result of these factors, the U.S. goods and services trade deficit with other countries (on a national income and product accounts basis) rose from $714.6 billion (5.7 percent of U.S. GDP) in 2005 to $762.0 billion (5.8 percent of GDP) in 2006, subsequently declining to $708.0 billion (5.1 percent of GDP) in 2007. U.S. goods and services imports in 2007 were $2.35 trillion, with imports rising by $327 billion from 2005 to 2007. U.S. goods and services exports in 2007 were $1.64 trillion, with exports rising by $334 billion between 2005 and 2007. The United States was the destination for nearly 23 percent of world goods exports in 2006 (excluding intra-EU25 trade).
(viii) Recent Challenges to the U.S. Economy
25. The United States has faced considerable economic challenges in recent months that are not fully reflected in data covering the period of review. These economic challenges are summarized as follows.
26. A decline in U.S. demand for housing in recent quarters has resulted in excess U.S. inventories of unsold homes, falling housing prices and declining levels of investment in new residential construction. Declining new home construction has directly subtracted from U.S. GDP growth since the first quarter of 2006. Furthermore, the rate of default on recently issued mortgages for the purchase of homes has risen. The results have been loss of homes for some U.S. homeowners, asset depreciation and solvency concerns for some lenders and substantially tighter credit conditions in U.S. financial markets. Falling housing prices, tight credit and a weakening job market are also negatively impacting U.S. consumer confidence. The full range of public policy responses, including monetary and fiscal policy actions, is being brought to bear to help resolve these economic challenges. Overall GDP growth until recently has stood up fairly well. Growth in the fourth quarter of last year, however, was a slight 0.6 percent at an annual rate and is widely expected in the first half of 2008 to be minimal, at best. Time will be required for the housing market to return to equilibrium, for public policy actions to have their full impact and for credit markets to fully absorb and adjust to the current challenges. The United States has full confidence that the current difficulties are being productively addressed and that the economy will move back to healthy expansion.
(ix) Conclusion
27. One of the great benefits of the WTO-based global trading system is to help facilitate needed economic adjustments by individual countries and by the system as a whole. Commitment to fulfilling current undertakings under the WTO and to working effectively toward further barrier removal and trade expansion is the heart of the post World War II trading system. But this commitment is never more important than at moments of stress in the world economy when false promises that restriction of import markets might ease domestic economic difficulties can be alluring. The United States strongly adheres to the objective of a well functioning, rules-based trading system and the further reduction and elimination of restrictions and distortions to the free flow of international trade under the WTO. The effective functioning of the WTO and the ultimate success of the Doha Development Agenda in lowering barriers to trade and further expanding international commerce is central to a U.S. vision of a healthy economic future for us and for our trade partners among high income and developing countries alike.
III. OPENNESS AND ACCOUNTABILITY: BUILDING SUPPORT FOR TRADE
28. Building support for trade among our diverse domestic constituencies and the international community is one of the most important challenges the WTO and its Members face. Improving the transparency and openness of both the WTO and our individual domestic processes, and ensuring that we hear the concerns of stakeholders, are among the keys to meeting this challenge. These issues are of great importance in the United States and are fundamental to the way our government operates and interacts with the American citizenry. We think it important that other WTO Members know more about how our system works, as they consider how best to build support for trade in their own countries and as we explore collectively how to address the same issues for the WTO. In this connection, we are very pleased that, to date, eight WTO dispute settlement panel meetings have been opened to public observation, and that more such meetings are scheduled to be opened as well. Not only do open meetings help the public to see the professional and objective manner in which dispute settlement is conducted and therefore facilitate implementation of the results, they also permit all Members, including those who do not participate frequently in disputes, to observe the dispute settlement system at work.
(i) The U.S. System
29. Consulting with those interested in and affected by issues is an important part of any government’s responsibility, and is a hallmark of the U.S. system. Advice from stakeholders is both a critical and integral part of the trade policy process. The U.S. government consults with interested parties on a regular basis through a variety of mechanisms, both formal and informal. U.S. Government agencies regularly solicit public comment on trade issues.
(a) Policy Coordination
30. The U.S. Trade Representative has primary responsibility, with the advice of the interagency trade policy mechanism, for developing and coordinating the implementation of U.S. trade policy, including on commodity matters and to the extent they are related to trade, direct investment matters. Under the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Congress established an interagency trade policy mechanism to assist with the implementation of these responsibilities. This system, as it has evolved, consists of three tiers of committees that constitute the principal mechanism for developing and coordinating U.S. Government positions on international trade and trade-related investment issues.
31. The Trade Policy Review Group (TPRG) and the Trade Policy Staff Committee (TPSC), administered and chaired by USTR, are the subcabinet interagency trade policy coordination groups that are central to this process. Supporting the TPSC are more than 80 subcommittees responsible for specialized issues. The TPSC is the first line operating group, with representation at the senior civil servant level. The TPSC regularly seeks advice from the public on its policy decisions and negotiations through Federal Register notices and public hearings.
32. Through the interagency process, USTR requests input and analysis from members of the appropriate TPSC subcommittee or task force. The conclusions and recommendations of this group are then presented to the full TPSC and serve as the basis for reaching interagency consensus. If agreement is not reached in the TPSC, or if particularly significant policy questions are being considered, issues are referred to the TPRG (Deputy USTR/Under Secretary level).
33. Member agencies of the TPSC and the TPRG consist of the Departments of Commerce, Agriculture, State, Treasury, Labor, Justice, Defense, Interior, Transportation, Energy, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Office of Management and Budget, the Council of Economic Advisers, the Council on Environmental Quality, the International Development Cooperation Agency, the National Economic Council, and the National Security Council. The U.S. International Trade Commission is a non-voting member of the TPSC and an observer at TPRG meetings. Representatives of other agencies also may be invited to attend meetings depending on the specific issues discussed.
(b) Advisory Committee Process
34. Private sector advice is both a critical and integral part of the trade policy process. USTR maintains an ongoing dialogue with interested private sector parties on trade agenda issues. The advisory committee system is unique since the committees meet on a regular basis and receive sensitive information about ongoing trade negotiations and other trade policy issues and developments.
35. The U.S. Congress established the private sector advisory committee system in 1974 to ensure that U.S. trade policy and trade negotiation objectives adequately reflect U.S. commercial and economic interests. Congress expanded and enhanced the role and objectives of this system in three subsequent Trade Acts. The system currently consists of 28 advisory committees, with a total membership of approximately 700 advisors and membership can grow to a total of up to 1,000 advisors. Recommendations for candidates for committee membership are collected from a number of sources, including Members of Congress, associations and organizations, publications, other federal agencies, and individuals who have demonstrated an interest or expertise in U.S. trade policy. Membership selection is based on qualifications, geography, and the needs of the specific committee. Members pay for their own travel and other related expenses.
36. The system is arranged in three tiers: (a) the President’s Advisory Committee for Trade Policy and Negotiations (ACTPN); (b) 5 policy advisory committees dealing with environment, labor, agriculture, Africa, and intergovernmental issues; and (c) 22 technical and sectoral advisory committees in the areas of industry and agriculture. Additional information on the advisory committee system can be found on the USTR website (http://www.ustr.gov /outreach/advise.shtml).
Tier I: The ACTPN
37. The ACTPN consists of not more than 45 members who are broadly representative of the key economic sectors affected by trade. The President appoints ACTPN members for two-year renewable terms. The ACTPN is the highest-tier committee in the system that examines U.S. trade policy and agreements from the broad context of the overall national interest. Members of ACTPN are appointed to represent a variety of interests including non-federal governments, labor, industry, agriculture, small business, service industries, retailers, and consumer interests.
Tier II: The Policy Advisory Committees
38. At the second tier, the members of the five policy advisory committees are appointed by the USTR alone or in conjunction with other Cabinet officers. The Intergovernmental Policy Advisory Committee (IGPAC) and the Trade Advisory Committee for Africa (TACA) are appointed and managed solely by USTR. The remaining three policy advisory committees that USTR manages jointly with the Departments of Agriculture and Labor, and the Environmental Protection Agency are, respectively, the Agricultural Policy Advisory Committee (APAC), Labor Advisory Committee for Trade Negotiations and Trade Policy (LAC), and the Trade and Environment Policy Advisory Committee (TEPAC). Each committee provides advice based upon the perspective of its specific area.
Tier III: The Technical and Sectoral Advisory Committees
39. At the third tier, the 22 technical and sectoral advisory committees are organized into two areas: industry and agriculture. Representatives are appointed jointly by the USTR and the Secretaries of Agriculture and Commerce, respectively. Each sectoral or technical committee represents a specific sector or commodity group and provides specific technical advice concerning the effect that trade policy decisions may have on its sector or issue.
40. Throughout 2007, USTR continued to solicit advice from cleared advisors, business and agriculture sectors, state governments, and other domestic stakeholders and the general public regarding U.S. objectives for the DDA in areas such as agriculture, non-agriculture market access and services. USTR also conducted outreach and consultations with advisors and domestic stakeholders on WTO accession negotiations for Cape Verde, Russia and Ukraine, for example. USTR developed Fact Sheets for posting TO the public website and disseminated these broadly to interested parties.
IV. TRADE POLICY DEVELOPMENTS SINCE 2006
(1) WTO AGREEMENTS AND INITIATIVES
(i) The Doha Development Agenda
41. The United States played a critical role in launching the Doha Round at the Fourth WTO Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar. At the core of the Doha Round is creation of additional economic opportunities through new and real market openings, as well as agricultural reform. These negotiations, along with the day-to-day implementation of the rules governing world trade, represent a dynamic approach to the furthering of global trade liberalization and strengthening of the rules-based trading system that is vital to the growth of the world economy and continued peace and prosperity. The United States has responded to the challenge and opportunity presented by the Doha Round by making ambitious proposals to advance the negotiations (See Annex I) and by working relentlessly to promote progress.
42. In his 2008 State of the Union address, President Bush noted that the United States is committed to concluding a strong Doha Round this year, and providing the leadership necessary to achieve this objective. The President reaffirmed his commitment to open world markets and to ensure that the Doha Round reaches an ambitious, successful conclusion at a March 12, 2008 speech before the U.S. Hispanic Chamber of Commerce. He stated that the time is now for WTO Members to "forge a deal that opens up global trade flows and creates new opportunities for developed and developing nations alike." With this in mind, the United States looks forward to each of our trading partners making similar contributions to ensure success.
(ii) Implementation of Existing Agreements
43. Since entry into force of the Uruguay Round Agreements in 1995, a central theme of U.S. policy has been to undertake the effective and timely implementation of our WTO commitments. We believe it is not only important for American trade interests, but for the WTO system as a whole, to ensure that all Members meet their commitments. The various manifestations of this policy range from active and constructive participation in the deliberations of WTO committees to the use of the dispute settlement mechanism. U.S. trade policy seeks to support and advance the rule of law.
44. The United States takes a leadership role in all aspects of WTO accessions, including bilateral, plurilateral, and multilateral negotiations. Our objective is to ensure that new Members fully implement WTO provisions and to encourage trade liberalization in developing and transforming economies. The United States also provides a broad range of technical assistance to countries seeking accession to the WTO to help them meet the requirements and challenges presented, both by the negotiations and the process of implementing WTO provisions in their trade regimes. This assistance is provided through USAID and the Commercial Law Development Program (CLDP) of the U.S. Department of Commerce" (see Section "V. Trade-Related Capacity Building Initiatives" below).
45. The United States continues to be among the most active participants in and frequent users of the WTO dispute settlement process, ensuring the enforcement of trade agreements and U.S. rights in the trading system. Whenever possible we have sought to reach favorable settlements that resolve the problem without having to resort to panel proceedings. Since the establishment of the WTO in 1995, the United States has filed 77 complaints at the WTO, thus far successfully concluding 49 of them by settling 25 cases favorably and prevailing in 24 others through litigation in WTO panels and the Appellate Body. The United States has accepted its responsibility to implement the rulings of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) in cases where a U.S. measure has been found to be inconsistent with our WTO obligations; and where legislation has been required, we have worked and continue to work with Congress to secure the necessary legislation.
(2) REGIONAL INITIATIVES
46. The United States pursues an active agenda of ambitious trade liberalization on the multilateral, regional and bilateral levels. Regional and bilateral agreements that are fully consistent with WTO rules and objectives can both support and expand trade liberalization in the multilateral trading system. With this in mind, and in order to capture and multiply the benefits of an expanding global trading system, the United States is actively embarked on an agenda of greater commercial interaction, including in emerging markets.
47. Regional work also includes monitoring compliance with, and improving functioning of, current agreements and programs, including the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), ASEAN Initiative (EAI), the Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR), the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA), and the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act (ATPDEA or ATPA).
48. Without exception, the regional initiatives in which the United States is involved look to the WTO as a solid foundation upon which to build. These initiatives are carried out in recognition of the desirability of increasing freedom of trade by the development, through voluntary agreements, of closer integration between the economies of the countries party to such agreements, as long as the agreements do not result in increasing the external barriers of the parties. Such agreements challenge the multilateral system to keep pace with the interests and needs of Members, and contribute to the WTO system by introducing innovation and strengthened disciplines. These agreements can become models for future multilateral liberalization in new areas, such as agriculture, services, investment, and environmental and labor standards. All completed regional and bilateral free trade agreements have been notified to the WTO. The United States submitted requests for waivers for preferences provided under the AGOA, CBTPA and ATPA programs in 2005, which are currently under consideration in the Council on Trade in Goods. The following regional initiatives are each examples of the potential for future liberalization in new areas.
(i) North American Free Trade Agreement
49. On January 1, 1994, the North American Free Trade Agreement between the United States, Canada, and Mexico (NAFTA) entered into force. NAFTA created the world’s largest free trade area, which now links 440 million people producing $16 trillion worth of goods and services. The dismantling of trade barriers and the opening of markets has led to economic growth and rising prosperity in all three countries. The closer economic relationship promoted by NAFTA also includes supplemental labor and environmental agreements. The NAFTA has dramatically improved our trade and economic relations with our neighbors. The net result of these efforts is more economic opportunity and growth, greater fairness in our trade relations, and better protection of worker rights and the environment in North America.
50. Trade between the United States and its NAFTA partners has soared since the Agreement entered into force. U.S. two-way trade with Canada and Mexico exceeds U.S. trade with the European Union and Japan combined. U.S. goods exports to NAFTA partners more than doubled between 1993 and 2007, from $142 billion to $385 billion, higher than U.S. export growth of 140 percent to the rest of the world over the same period.
51. By dismantling barriers, NAFTA has led to increased trade and investment, growth in employment, and enhanced competitiveness. From 1994 to 2005, cumulative foreign direct investment in the NAFTA countries has increased by over $1.8 trillion. Increased investment has brought more and better-paying jobs, as well as lower costs and more choices for consumers and producers.
(ii) Free Trade Area of the Americas Negotiations
52. As agreed at the Fourth Summit of the Americas of November 2005 ("Mar del Plata Summit"), the government of Colombia undertook consultations to facilitate the exploration of the positions put forth at the Summit. The vast majority of leaders in the hemisphere, including President Bush, called for a continuation of the FTAA negotiations and the resumption of trade meetings. Other leaders indicated that the conditions did not yet exist for the achievement of the FTAA. All 34 leaders agreed to explore these two positions in light of the outcome of the December 2005 WTO ministerial meeting. Colombia’s consultations were aimed at facilitating a meeting of trade officials; however, there was no agreement on the timing of a meeting and the FTAA negotiations remained suspended during 2006 and 2007.
(iii) Central America and the Dominican Republic
53. On August 5, 2004, the United States signed the Dominican Republic–Central America–United States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR) with five Central American countries (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua) and the Dominican Republic.
54. On August 2, 2005, President Bush signed the implementing legislation for the CAFTA-DR. The CAFTA-DR entered into force for El Salvador on March 1, 2006; for Honduras on April 1, 2006; for Nicaragua on April 1, 2006; for Guatemala on July 1, 2006; and for the Dominican Republic on March 1, 2007. Costa Rica approved the CAFTA-DR through a national referendum on October 7, 2007. The agreement has not yet entered into force for Costa Rica, however, pending their adoption of implementing legislation and regulations.
55. The CAFTA-DR is the first free trade agreement between the United States and a group of smaller developing economies. This historic agreement will create new economic opportunities by eliminating tariffs, opening markets, promoting transparency, and establishing state-of-the-art rules for 21st century commerce. It will facilitate trade and investment among the signatory countries and further regional integration.
56. Central America and the Dominican Republic represent the third largest U.S. export market in Latin America, behind Mexico and Brazil. U.S. exports to the CAFTA-DR countries were valued at $22.1 billion in 2007. Combined total two-way trade in 2007 between the United States and Central America and the Dominican Republic was nearly US$41 billion.
(iv) Southern African Customs Union Free Trade Agreement Negotiations
57. The United States and the Southern African Customs Union (SACU)–comprising Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, Swaziland, and South Africa–launched free trade agreement (FTA) negotiations in 2003. Active FTA negotiations were suspended in April 2006. The FTA remains a longer-term objective for both the United States and SACU.
(v) Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum
58. The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum has been instrumental in advancing regional and global trade and investment liberalization since it was founded in 1989. It has provided a forum for Leaders to meet annually since 1993, when APEC Leaders met at Blake Island in the United States. The United States considers APEC an important vehicle for building a regional economic structure to ensure prosperity and stability over the long-term.
59. In 2007, the United States worked closely with Australia, the APEC Chair that year, to lead APEC Member Economies in pursuing an ambitious trade and investment liberalization agenda. Specifically, APEC helped to advance the WTO Doha Development Agenda negotiations, promote regional economic integration, strengthen intellectual property rights (IPR) protection and enforcement, spotlight the need for work on food and product import safety, advance trade in environmental goods and services, and set high standards for FTAs. In 2008, the United States will work with Peru, the APEC Chair this year, to develop concrete actions in these areas.
60. APEC Member Economies continue to exercise leadership in the WTO. In September 2007, APEC Leaders issued a strong statement pledging to demonstrate the "political will, flexibility and ambition to ensure the Doha Round negotiations enter their final phase" in 2007. Furthermore, they pledged to take steps to "resume negotiations on the basis of the draft texts tabled by the chairs of the negotiating groups on agriculture and non-agricultural market access." APEC Leaders defined a successful Doha agreement as one that "delivers real and substantial market access improvement for agricultural and industrial goods and for services." At their first meeting of 2008 in February, Senior Officials reiterated these sentiments by stating in the SOM Chair’s Communiqué that, "Supporting the multilateral trading system remains the highest priority for APEC Economies"…and committing "to work towards an ambitious and balanced outcome that delivers real commercial gains."
(vi) The Enterprise for ASEAN Initiative (EAI)
61. President Bush announced in October 2002 a major new initiative, the Enterprise for ASEAN Initiative (EAI). The EAI is intended to strengthen U.S. trade and investment ties with ASEAN both as a region and bilaterally. The ten-member ASEAN group of countries collectively is the United States’ fifth largest trading partner and trade continues to grow steadily, with $172 billion in two-way goods trade in 2007. With rapidly growing economies and a collective population of around 500 million, the ASEAN market provides significant potential opportunities for U.S. companies. For ASEAN, this initiative will help boost trade and redirect investment back to the ASEAN region. In August 2006, the United States and ASEAN deepened the relationship by concluding a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement. This regional TIFA represents the commitment by both the United States and ASEAN countries to build upon the already strong trade and investment ties between us and to promote ASEAN regional economic integration.
(vii) Middle East Free Trade Area (MEFTA)
62. The United States Middle East Free Trade Area initiative (MEFTA) seeks to promote trade expansion and economic reforms in North Africa and the Middle East leading to a Middle East Free Trade Area within a decade. USTR has made significant progress in implementing the Middle East Free Trade Area (MEFTA) initiative. Bilateral FTAs with Israel, Jordan, Morocco, Bahrain, and Oman have been concluded. The United States and the United Arab Emirates have, for the immediate future, decided to build on the progress made in previous FTA negotiations by deepening their economic relationship through an enhanced Trade and Investment Framework Agreement process. Progress on WTO accessions has also been made. Saudi Arabia joined the WTO in December 2005. The United States currently supports the WTO accession efforts of Iraq, Lebanon, Algeria, Yemen, and Libya.
(viii) Enhancing Transatlantic Economic Relations
63. The huge size, advanced integration, and generally robust health of the transatlantic trade and investment relationship have provided an anchor of prosperity for both sides of the Atlantic, even as economic conditions in other parts of the world fluctuate. Recognizing the benefits of preserving and enhancing these productive ties, the United States and the EU for some time have been interested in exploring ways to create new opportunities for transatlantic economic activity. Appreciating the benefits of enhanced transatlantic economic ties, the United States and the EU continue actively to pursue initiatives to create new opportunities for transatlantic economic activity.
64. At the April 2007 U.S.-EU Summit, Leaders launched the Framework for Advancing Transatlantic Economic Integration, with the goal of fostering cooperation and reducing trade and investment barriers through a multi-year work program. Building upon the 2005 U.S.-EU Initiative to Enhance Economic Integration and Growth, this new Framework also established the Transatlantic Economic Council (TEC) to oversee the efforts outlined in the Framework and accelerate progress on economic integration. The initial TEC meeting in November 2007 reviewed progress in removing barriers to trade and investment and in easing regulatory burdens, and mandated specific action plans and commitments for further progress before the next TEC meeting in May, 2008.
(ix) African Growth and Opportunity Act
65. The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) provides incentives to promote economic reform and trade expansion in sub-Saharan Africa, including duty-free access to the U.S. market for products made in beneficiary sub-Saharan African countries. The AGOA Acceleration Act of 2004, signed by President Bush into law on July 13, 2004, amended several key provisions of AGOA. It extended the authorization of the overall AGOA program from 2008 to 2015 and extended AGOA’s special third-country fabric provision by three years, to September 30, 2007. Under this provision, less-developed beneficiary countries are permitted to third-country fabric in apparel imported into the United States under AGOA, subject to an overall cap.
66. In 2007, the Administration worked to implement the enhancements to AGOA contained in the Africa Investment Incentive Act (AIIA), which President Bush signed on December 20, 2006. The AIIA extended to 2012 the AGOA third-country fabric provision that allows duty-free treatment for imports from lesser-developed AGOA beneficiary countries of qualifying AGOA apparel made of fabric from any source. For lesser-developed AGOA beneficiary countries, the AIIA expanded the list of items eligible for duty-free treatment to include certain non-apparel textile products if originating entirely in one or more lesser developed beneficiary sub-Saharan African countries.
67. AGOA requires the President to monitor, review, and report to Congress annually on the progress of sub-Saharan African countries in meeting the AGOA eligibility criteria set out in the legislation. If the President determines that a country is not making continual progress in meeting these criteria, he is required to terminate that country’s eligibility for the following year.
68. An interagency AGOA Implementation Subcommittee, chaired by USTR, makes recommendations to the President on AGOA eligibility of countries based on an annual eligibility review. The Subcommittee draws information from the private sector, non-governmental organizations, U.S. Government agencies, and prospective beneficiary governments.
69. No countries were removed from AGOA eligibility in 2007. In June 2007, on the basis of an interim eligibility review, President Bush determined that Mauritania was meeting the eligibility criteria. He therefore re-designated Mauritania as a beneficiary country (it had been removed from AGOA eligibility in 2006). This re-designation brings the total number of AGOA-eligible countries to 39.
70. As of December 2007, 26 AGOA-eligible countries had instituted acceptable customs measures to prevent illegal transshipment and, accordingly, had been certified as eligible to export qualifying apparel to the United States under AGOA.
71. AGOA also institutionalizes a process for strengthening U.S. trade relations with sub-Saharan African countries by establishing an annual ministerial level forum with AGOA-eligible countries. AGOA established a U.S.-Sub-Saharan Africa Trade and Economic Cooperation Forum – informally known as "the AGOA Forum" – to discuss expanding trade and investment relations between the United States and sub-Saharan African countries and AGOA implementation. The sixth meeting of the Forum was held in July 2007 in Accra, Ghana.
72. AGOA and related Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) imports from AGOA-eligible countries were valued at $51.1 billion in 2007, up 15 percent from 2006. AGOA non-oil imports also continued to grow, totaling $3.4 billion in 2007, a seven percent increase over 2006, with notable increases in such sectors as prepared vegetables, fruits and nuts, optical parts and accessories, cut flowers, beverages, cocoa products, and essential oils.
(x) The Caribbean Basin Initiative
73. The Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) currently provides beneficiary countries and territories with duty-free access to the U.S. market. They are: Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, British Virgin Islands, Costa Rica, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Montserrat, Netherlands Antilles, Panama, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and Trinidad and Tobago.
74. During 2007, the trade programs collectively known as the CBI remained a vital element in U.S. economic relations with its neighbors in Central America and the Caribbean. CBI was initially launched in 1983 through the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA). It was substantially expanded in 2000 through the United States - Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act (CBTPA). The Trade Act of 2002 increased the type and quantity of textile and apparel articles eligible for preferential tariff treatment accorded to designated beneficiary CBTPA countries. Among other actions, the Trade Act of 2002 extended duty-free treatment for clothing made in beneficiary countries from both U.S. and regional inputs, and increased the quantity of clothing made from regional inputs that regional producers can ship duty-free to the United States annually.
75. When the CAFTA-DR entered into force for each of its member countries , that country ceased to be designated as a CBERA and CBTPA beneficiary. When the CAFTA-DR enters into force for Costa Rica, that country will cease to be designated as a CBERA and CBTPA beneficiary country. The United States and Panama signed a free trade agreement on June 28, 2007, but that agreement has not yet entered into force.
76. In conjunction with economic reform and trade liberalization, the trade benefits of the CBERA, since its inception, have helped CBI beneficiary countries diversify their exports and have contributed to their economic growth. At the inception of the CBI in 1983, traditional and primary products such as coffee, bananas, sugar, and mineral fuels accounted for a majority of U.S. imports from the region. By 2006, that percentage had fallen to approximately 37 percent, reflecting the increase in the value of energy and related chemical products and the exit from CBERA of four major apparel producing countries.
(xi) Andean Trade Preference Act
77. One of the ways the United States conducts its trade relationship with the Andean countries is in the framework of the unilateral trade preferences of the Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA), as amended by the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act (ATPDEA). Congress enacted the ATPA in 1991 in recognition of the fact that regional economic development is necessary in order for Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru to provide economic alternatives to the illegal drug trade.
78. The original ATPA expired in 2001. The ATPDEA, which was signed into law on August 6, 2002 as part of the Trade Act of 2002, restored the benefits of the ATPA, providing for retroactive reimbursement of duties paid during the lapse in the program. In addition, while the original ATPA excluded from duty-free treatment products in several sectors including textiles, apparel, footwear, articles of leather, and tuna in airtight containers, the ATPDEA expanded the list of items eligible for duty-free treatment by about 700 products.
79. The most significant expansion of benefits in the ATPA, as amended by the ATPDEA, was in the apparel sector. Other new products benefiting from the program included: tuna in pouches, leather products, footwear, petroleum and petroleum products, and watches and watch parts.
80. The ATPA, as amended, was extended on December 9, 2006 until June 30, 2007. On June 30, 2007, Congress extended the ATPA through February 29, 2008. On February 29, 2008, the President signed into law Congress’s third extension of the ATPA as amended through December 31, 2008. The U.S. Administration supported this short-term extension of ATPA to secure approval of the pending free trade agreement with Colombia and implement the Peru and Colombia agreements.
(3) BILATERAL FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS (FTAS)
81. Today, the United States is party to FTAs with 20 countries in every corner of the world (14 in force, 3 approved by Congress but not yet in force, and 3 concluded but not yet approved by Congress).
(i) United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement
82. The United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement, which took effect January 1, 2004, continues to fuel growth in bilateral trade between the United States and Chile. In 2007, U.S. exports to Chile were $8.0 billion, while U.S. imports from Chile totaled $9.0 billion. U.S. exports of private commercial services to Chile were $1.5 billion in 2006 (latest data available), and U.S. imports were $781 million. The stock of U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI) in Chile was $10.2 billion in 2006 (latest data available), up from $9.6 billion in 2005.
(ii) United States-Singapore Free Trade Agreement
83. The United States-Singapore Free Trade Agreement (FTA) has been in force since January 1, 2004. Singapore is the United States’ 14th largest trading partner, with two-way trade in goods totaling $46 billion in 2007. U.S. exports of private commercial services to Singapore were $6.7 billion in 2006 (latest data available), and U.S. imports were $3.9 billion. The stock of U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI) in Singapore was $60.4 billion in 2006 (latest data available), up from $54.5 billion in 2005.
(iii) United States-Jordan Free Trade Agreement
84. The U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement (FTA), signed in October 2000, entered into force in December 2001. The FTA’s comprehensive measures have played a significant role in boosting United States-Jordanian economic ties. U.S. goods exports to Jordan in 2007 were $879 million, while corresponding U.S. imports from Jordan were $1.4 billion. The stock of U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI) in Jordan was $40 million in 2006 (latest data available), up from $1 million in 2005.
(iv) United States-Israel Free Trade Agreement
85. The 1985 U.S.-Israel Free Trade Agreement (FTA), the first FTA signed by the United States, continues to serve as a foundation for expanding trade and investment between the United States and Israel. U.S. goods exports in 2007 were $13.0 billion. Corresponding U.S. goods imports from Israel were $19.0 billion. U.S. exports of private commercial services to Israel were $3.0 billion in 2006 (latest data available), and U.S. imports were $2.3 billion. The stock of U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI) in Israel was $10.0 billion in 2006 (latest data available), up from $8.4 billion in 2005.
86. In 1996, in the interest of achieving practical improvements in agricultural trade between the two countries and without prejudice to the parties’ rights and obligations under the FTA, the United States and Israel signed an adjunct to the FTA, the U.S.-Israel Agreement on Trade in Agricultural Products (ATAP). The 1996 agreement was extended through 2003 and a new agreement was concluded in 2004. The 2004 agreement is scheduled to expire at the end of 2008. In February 2008, the United States and Israel initiated discussions on launching a new round of ATAP negotiations.
(v) United States-Australia Free Trade Agreement
87. The United States-Australia Free Trade Agreement (FTA) entered into force on January 1, 2005. Two-way annual goods trade in 2007 was $27.7 billion and two-way services trade in 2006 (latest data available) was $13.9 billion, an increase of approximately 113 percent and 144 percent respectively since 1994. U.S. exports of private commercial services (i.e., excluding military and government) to Australia were $9.1 billion in 2006 (latest data available), and U.S. imports were $4.8 billion. The stock of U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI) in Australia was $122.6 billion in 2006 (latest data available), up from $115.6 billion in 2005.
(vi) United States-Morocco Free Trade Agreement
88. The United States and Morocco signed a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) on June 15, 2004. The U.S. Congress subsequently approved the Agreement, and in August 2005 President Bush signed the implementing legislation. The Moroccan Parliament passed the Agreement in early 2005 and the Agreement entered into force on January 1, 2006. The United States-Morocco FTA is an important part of the Administration’s effort to establish a Middle East Free Trade Area (MEFTA) by 2013. U.S. goods exports to Morocco in 2007 were $1.3 billion, up 53 percent from the previous year. Corresponding U.S. imports from Morocco were $648 million, up 24 percent. The stock of U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI) in Morocco was $311 million in 2006 (latest data available), up from $302 million in 2005.
(vii) United States-Bahrain Free Trade Agreement
89. On May 21, 2003, the United States and Bahrain announced their intention to negotiate a Free Trade Agreement (FTA). Bahrain’s Parliament approved and the King of Bahrain ratified the FTA in July 2005. The U.S. Congress enacted legislation approving and implementing the FTA in December 2005, and President Bush signed the legislation on January 11, 2006. The FTA entered into force on August 1, 2006. U.S. exports in 2007 were $591 million. Corresponding U.S. imports from Bahrain were $626 million. The stock of U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI) in Bahrain was $107 million in 2006 (latest data available), down from $179 million in 2005.
90. The U.S.-Bahrain FTA will also promote President Bush’s policy of advancing economic reforms and liberalization in the Middle East and to establish a Middle East Free Trade Area by 2013. The United States-Bahrain Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT), which took effect in May 2001, covers investment issues between the two countries.
(viii) United States-Thailand Free Trade Agreement Negotiations
91. The United States initiated free-trade agreement negotiations with Thailand in 2004. Those negotiations were suspended in 2006. U.S. goods exports in 2007 were $8.4 billion. Corresponding U.S. imports from Thailand were $22.8 billion1.3 percent. U.S. exports of private commercial services (i.e., excluding military and government) to Thailand were $1.6 billion in 2006 (latest data available), and U.S. imports were $1.1 billion. The stock of U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI) in Thailand was $8.2 billion in 2006 (latest data available), up from $6.6 billion in 2005.
(ix) United States-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement
92. The United States and Peru signed the United States-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement (PTPA) on April 12, 2006. The Peruvian Congress has ratified the Agreement. The U.S. Congress voted to enact the United States-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement Implementation Act (PTPA) by a wide margin and President Bush signed it into law on December 14, 2007. The United States’ two-way trade with Peru doubled over the last four years to $9.3 billion in 2007. U.S. goods exports in 2007 were $4.1 billion. Corresponding U.S. imports from Peru were $5.2 billion. The stock of U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI) in Peru was $5.0 billion in 2006 (latest data available), up from $4.2 billion in 2005.
(x) United States-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement
93. The United States and Colombia signed the United States-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement (U.S.-Colombia TPA) in November 2006. The Administration currently seeks prompt Congressional approval of the agreement. The United States’ two-way trade with Colombia reached $17.6 billion in 2007. U.S. goods exports to Colombia in that year were $8.6 billion. Corresponding U.S. imports from Colombia were $9.4 billion. The stock of U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI) in Colombia was $4.9 billion in 2006 (latest data available), up from $4.2 billion in 2005.
(xi) United States-Panama Free Trade Agreement
94. The United States and Panama launched negotiations on a free trade agreement in April 2004 and concluded the negotiations in December 2006. The two governments signed the United States – Panama Trade Promotion Agreement (TPA) on June 28, 2007. Panama approved the TPA on July 11, 2007. We are seeking Congressional approval this year. U.S. goods exports in 2007 were $3.7 billion. Corresponding U.S. imports from Panama were $366 million. The stock of U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI) in Panama was $5.7 billion in 2006 (latest data available), down from $5.8 billion in 2005.
(xii) United States-Oman Free Trade Agreement
95. On November 15, 2004, the Administration formally notified Congress of its intent to negotiate a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with Oman. After seven months of negotiations, the completed FTA was signed on January 19, 2006. The U.S. Congress enacted legislation approving and implementing the Agreement in September 2006, and President Bush signed the legislation on September 26, 2006. The Omani government is working to enact the necessary implementing legislation and regulations; the FTA is expected to enter into force in 2008.
96. The U.S.-Oman FTA will build on the U.S. initiative to advance economic reforms and openness in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf and to establish a Middle East Free Trade Area by 2013. U.S. goods exports in 2007 were $1.1 billion. Corresponding U.S. imports from Oman were $1.0 billion. The stock of U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI) in Oman 2006 was $819 million (latest data available), up from $528 million in 2005.
(xiii) United States-Korea Free Trade Agreement
97. After eight formal negotiating rounds, the first of which took place in June 2006, the United States and the Republic of Korea successfully concluded the negotiation of a free trade agreement on April 1, 2007. On June 30, 2007, the United States and Korea signed the United States-Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA). The agreement awaits Congressional approval. U.S. goods exports to Korea in 2007 were $34.7 billion. Corresponding U.S. imports from Korea were $47.6 billion. U.S. exports of private commercial services (i.e., excluding military and government) to Korea were $11.5 billion in 2006 (latest data available), and U.S. imports were $6.4 billion. The stock of U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI) in Korea was $22.3 billion in 2006 (latest data available), up from $18.2 billion in 2005. We are seeking a full reopening of the Korean market to U.S. beef and passage of KORUS this year.
(xiv) United States-Malaysia Free Trade Agreement Negotiations
98. The United States and Malaysia launched Free Trade Agreement (FTA) negotiations in March 2006, and six rounds of negotiations have been held to date. Progress has been made, although significant challenges remain. An FTA with Malaysia would encourage additional trade and investment, further deepening our already strong economic partnership – with nearly $44 billion in two-way trade in goods in 2007, $2.5 billion in two-way trade in services in 2006, and $12.5 billion in foreign direct investment in 2006. U.S. exports of private commercial services (i.e., excluding military and government) to Malaysia were $1.6 billion in 2006 (latest data available), and U.S. imports were $840 million. The stock of U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI) in Malaysia was $12.5 billion in 2006 (latest data available), up from $10.3 billion in 2005.
V. TRADE-RELATED CAPACITY BUILDING INITIATIVES
99. Trade Capacity Building (TCB) is a critical part of the United States’ strategy to help developing countries to implement and take advantage of market-opening and reform-oriented trade agreements. It is important to improve the linkage between trade and development by providing developing countries with the tools to maximize trade opportunities. Integral to the Administration’s goal of accelerating growth and economic reform in the developing world and most importantly in its poorest regions are the four U.S. preference programs (the Generalized System of Preferences, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), the Caribbean Basin Initiative, and the Andean Trade Preference Act) through which eligible products enter the United States duty-free from 131 beneficiary developing countries. In 2007, the Administration also worked to implement enhancements to AGOA that were granted to lesser-developed countries by the Africa Investment Incentive Act (AIIA), which President Bush signed on December 20, 2006.
100. U.S. imports under these programs have grown sharply since 2002 and now constitute a significant share of imports from many beneficiary countries. The Administration is employing many ways to increase the trade under preference programs and distribute their benefits, especially to lesser- and least-developed beneficiaries.
101. For the first time, U.S. free trade agreements with developing countries establish trade capacity building committees that are charged with developing programs to assist with the implementation of the obligations of the agreements and with the transition to liberalized trade resulting from the agreements. These committees have already begun to meet under the CAFTA-DR, and will begin meeting under the Peru, Colombia and Panama FTAs as soon as they have entered into force.
102. This early strategy by the Administration of incorporating trade capacity building into its bilateral trade negotiations, and making increased trade an objective of its development work, was adopted in the WTO in the form of the "Aid for Trade" initiatives, including the "Integrated Framework".
103. In 2008, the United States will continue to work together with other WTO Members on Aid for Trade efforts, which not only provide technical assistance, but also help create the legal, administrative, and physical infrastructure that developing countries need to participate fully in the global marketplace. TCB is an important element of the U.S. development assistance framework and is provided by a number of U.S. government agencies. The two primary implementers of U.S. TCB efforts are the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC). Their broad work is complemented by more than twenty U.S. government agencies providing assistance in their areas of specialization. As noted above, TCB is also an integral part of a number of trade agreements and programs, including AGOA and free trade agreements. As the largest single donor of TCB assistance, the United States is pleased to lead these TCB efforts.
104. Complementing these efforts was the establishment in 2004 of the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), which has committed $5.5 billion in project investments to date that encompasses more than $3.4 billion in trade-related investments. MCC assistance is uniquely grant-based and is directed solely toward poorer developing countries. MCC has committed this financial support, principally for infrastructure, to 16 qualifying countries in Africa, Latin America, the Caucasus, and Asia/Pacific during the MCC’s four years of operations. USTR is a member of the MCC Board of Directors and encourages MCC funding that helps the poorest countries take advantage of global trade opportunities.
105. The United States is committed to assisting developing countries build up their capacity by providing aid for trade. Total U.S. funding for TCB activities from 2001 to 2007 was approximately $7.1 billion. In 2007, TCB funding was distributed as follows:
• Asia: $96 million, for a total of $875 million since 2001
• Central and Eastern Europe: $30 million, for a total of $394 million since 2001
• Former Soviet Republics: $74 million, for a total of $800 million since 2001
• Latin America and Caribbean: $554 million, for a total of $1.9 billion since 2001
• Middle East and North Africa: $57 million, for a total of $1 billion since 2001
• Sub-Saharan Africa: $505 million, for a total of $1.6 billion since 2001
106. The United States has and will continue to support the WTO’s catalytic role in aid for trade as well as the Enhanced Integrated Framework that aims to help the least trade-active countries participate in the global trading system.
107. An important element of this work involves coordination with regard to technical assistance activities among international institutions such as the WTO, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the regional development banks, and other donors. The Administration’s intention is to avoid duplication and to identify and take advantage of donor complementarities in programming. The United States will work in partnership with these institutions and with other donors to ensure that international financial institutions (IFIs) offer trade-related assistance as an integral component of development programs – including increasing awareness of existing mechanisms and programs – tailored to the circumstances within each developing country.
108. The United States’ efforts build on its long-standing commitment to help all countries benefit from the global trading system, including through mechanisms such as the Enhanced Integrated Framework and the Millennium Challenge Corporation; contributions to the WTO=s Global Trust Fund for Trade-Related Technical Assistance; assistance to countries acceding to the WTO; targeted assistance for developing countries participating in U.S. preference programs, such as the $200 million African Global Competitiveness Initiative helping Africa benefit from AGOA; coordination of assistance through Trade and Investment Framework Agreements (TIFAs); TCB working groups that are integral elements of free trade negotiations; and Committees on TCB created to aid in the implementation of a number of FTAs, including the FTAs with the Dominican Republic and Central America, and Peru. Similar committees will also aid in the implementation of FTAs with Colombia and Panama as those enter into force. Other TCB assistance is helping developing countries to work with the private sector and non-governmental organizations to transition to more open economies, to prepare for FTA and WTO negotiations and to implement their trade obligations.
VI. LEGISLATIVE AGENDA
109. In 2007, USTR worked closely with the 110th Congress to move forward President Bush’s bilateral, regional, and multilateral trade agenda. USTR maintained an ongoing dialogue with the Congress on multilateral initiatives, consulting with the Congress on the WTO Doha Development Round and on legislation intended to bring the United States into compliance with WTO rulings that found against the United States.
110. Also, consultations with the Congress provided the Administration with valuable advice on the United States-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement, the United States-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement, the United States – Panama Trade Promotion Agreement, and the United States-Korea Free Trade Agreement.
111. The Administration signed the United States-Panama and United States-Korea FTAs in June 2007 and also signed protocols to our FTAs with Peru and Colombia in June. In December 2007, the Congress passed with strong bipartisan support and President Bush signed into law the United States-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement Implementation Act.
112. USTR also continued its consultations with the Congress with respect to FTA negotiations with Malaysia, Thailand, the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), and the Free Trade Area of the Americas. The Administration consulted with the Congress on a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement with Uruguay and a Bilateral Investment Treaty with Rwanda. USTR also worked with Congress to reauthorize the Andean Trade Preference Act which ultimately resulted in its 10-month extension to December 31, 2008.
113. During its remaining time in office, the Administration will continue to work with Congress to secure prompt consideration of the agreements with Colombia, Panama, and Korea in 2008. Together with Congress, the President has pledged to work to improve the Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) program and help trade-affected workers and farmers access the training and reemployment services they need to return to work quickly and to be in a position to compete globally.
VII. LABOR ISSUES
114. The trade policy agenda of the United States includes a strong commitment to protecting the rights of workers in America and in countries with which we trade. A concerted focus on worker training and education policies will continue to ensure that the American workforce can compete globally. For workers displaced by trade, the Trade Adjustment Assistance Reform Act of 2002 (Title I of the Trade Act of 2002) modifies and expands the TAA for Workers program. TAA helps workers adversely affected by foreign trade through the provision of re-employment services: job training for displaced workers, income support while in training and job search and relocation assistance. Important changes to the program made in 2002 include expanded eligibility to more worker groups, increased benefits, and tax credits for health insurance coverage assistance. Congress has appropriated funds for the TAA program through September 30, 2008. More information on the U.S. TAA program can be found at http://www.doleta.gov/tradeact.
115. In pursuing trade liberalization through free trade agreements, we rely on the congressional guidance contained in the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002 (TPA) to bring the benefits of trade and open markets to America and the rest of the world. In addition, for free trade agreements pending in 2007, we relied on the principles articulated in the Bipartisan Agreement on Trade Policy of May 10, 2007 between the Administration and congressional leaders. During 2007, USTR continued to consult with the Congress on the labor provisions of each pending trade agreement to ensure that each one met the objectives of TPA and the May 10, 2007 Bipartisan Agreement. USTR also continued to work cooperatively with other U.S. agencies in multilateral, regional, and bilateral fora to promote respect for core labor standards, including the abolition of the worst forms of child labor.
116. U.S. labor law is consistent with the principles underlying fundamental workers' rights. For example, the U.S. Constitution assures the right of freedom of association. National legislation, including the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) of 1935 and the Railway Labor Act of 1926, provides the right to organize and bargain collectively. Section 7 of the NLRA guarantees that "[e]mployees shall have the right to self organization, to form, join or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing. ..."
117. The Thirteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, ratified in 1865, provides that "[n]either slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction." Implementing federal legislation prohibits forced or compulsory labor.
118. The United States applies and seeks to enforce prohibitions against harmful child labor. The United States has also ratified the ILO Convention 182 Concerning the Worst Forms of Child Labor (1999). The Fair Labor Standards Act prohibits "oppressive child labor" and the interstate transportation of products made with such labor. Similarly, U.S. laws both Federal and State prohibit discrimination with respect to occupation and employment on the grounds of race, creed, national origin, or gender. Such laws are vigorously enforced in both the public and private sectors to assure non discrimination at work.
VIII. ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES
119. The Administration has continued and enhanced its efforts to pursue opportunities to address environmental objectives through multilateral, regional and bilateral trade initiatives. On the multilateral front, the United States has been a global leader in seeking to discipline harmful fisheries subsidies and eliminate barriers to trade in environmental technologies and services through the WTO as part of the Doha Development Agenda (DDA). Ongoing efforts in free trade agreement negotiations culminated in the development of new groundbreaking environmental provisions associated with the Administration’s bipartisan trade deal with the Congress. The Administration has also used additional bilateral trade fora to promote action on critical global environmental challenges, such as illegal logging.
120. In 2007 the United States contributed to the intensification of the WTO’s work on liberalization of trade in environmental goods in the Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE) in Special Session, including through a joint proposal with the European Communities that lays the groundwork for an innovative new agreement on environmental goods and services (EGSA) and action to eliminate trade barriers to climate-friendly technologies. The United States believes that increased market access for environmental goods and services is an effective means to enhance access to environmental technologies around the world and has continued to advance pragmatic ideas for product coverage and modalities in negotiations on environmental goods. In the Rules Negotiating Group, the United States continues to lead in pressing for stronger disciplines on fisheries subsidies that contribute significantly to global overcapacity and overfishing. In March 2007, the United States submitted a far-reaching textual proposal for a fisheries subsidies agreement, which included a broad prohibition of the most harmful subsidies.
121. With respect to the DDA trade and environment agenda that does not specifically involve negotiations, the United States continued to play an active role, particularly through emphasizing the importance of capacity-building. This work included discussions in the CTE Regular Session with respect to the environmental implications of all areas under negotiation in the DDA.
122. In 2007, the link between trade and environmental policy was strengthened in the Bipartisan Agreement on Trade Policy of May 10. Pursuant to that agreement, the United States worked with its FTA partners Peru, Colombia, Panama, and Korea to include in those FTAs provisions that require each country to adopt, maintain and implement laws, regulations and all other measures to fulfill obligations covered under multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs). The obligations in the Environment Chapter of each agreement are subject to the same dispute settlement provisions as those in any other chapter. Also in 2007, the United States led efforts to reform and revitalize the International Coffee Organization (ICO), concluding a new International Coffee Agreement (ICA) in September. As a result of the new agreement, the ICO will be able to demonstrate the role of international commodity organizations in facilitating international trade and sustainable development in economic, social and environmental terms and in a manner consistent with market principles. In 2008, the United States will continue its leadership in Doha negotiations to include in the final agreement disciplines on fisheries subsidies.
IX. LOOKING FORWARD
123. Trade liberalization continues to be at the forefront of the U.S. international economic policy. The powerful and positive impact of the multilateral trading system over the past half century cannot be overstated. The Doha Development Agenda of the WTO continues to hold the greatest potential for catalyzing global economic growth through further trade liberalization. As has always been true of the GATT/WTO, the extent of liberalization – and to a large degree the distribution of the benefits of that liberalization – depends on the participation by each Member of the WTO. The United States will continue to work towards an ambitious conclusion to the Doha Development Agenda in order to reduce poverty and raise living standards across the globe. Expanding market access in the three key sectors of the international economy: industrial and consumer goods, agricultural products and services will yield the greatest impact on trade flows, thereby reducing poverty and raising living standards. An ambitious result in market access will be the greatest legacy of our DDA work.
124. The United States will seek to complete pending free trade agreements to further foster trade and economic growth, and to serve as a catalyst for multilateral liberalization. In addition, the United States will continue to encourage increased trade with many developing countries through our preferential trade measures, such as the Generalized System of Preferences, the African Growth and Opportunity Act, the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act, and the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act. The United States will also continue its commitment to increasing trade capacity in developing countries.
125. By undertaking these various elements – forging global, regional and bilateral trade agreements; encouraging developing countries’ multilateral integration; building support for open trade; encouraging sustainable development and core labor standards; and fostering greater transparency – the United States will continue to play its traditional leadership role in promoting trade liberalization and developing a trading system of benefit to all.
126. The Administration is convinced that, in the years ahead, the United States must continue boldly to lead international efforts to open markets and increase economic integration – and continue the economic policies of the last six decades which have produced the most diverse, innovative, productive, open and prosperous economy in history. The pursuit of these policies – embraced by Republican and Democratic Administrations and Congresses alike – has created a strong foundation on which to build prosperity and freedom for future generations. With improved growth performance in the global economy, the future expansion and prosperity of U.S. manufacturers, service providers, workers and farmers will be strongly influenced by the degree to which they have access to 95 percent of the world’s consumers who reside outside the U.S. borders.


ANNEX I
U.S. SUBMISSIONS TO THE WTO IN SUPPORT
OF THE DOHA DEVELOPMENT AGENDA
(WTO document symbol in parentheses)

Committee on Agriculture, Special Session

• Export Competition, Market Access and Domestic Support (JOB(02)/122)
• Joint EC-US Paper on Agriculture (JOB(03)/157)
• Proposal for Tariff Rate Quota Reform (G/AG/NG/W/58)
• Proposal for Comprehensive Long-Term Agricultural Trade Reform (G/AG/NG/W/15)
• Note on Domestic Support Reform (G/AG/NG/W/16)
• Tariff Quota Administration (JOB(06)/188)
• Domestic Support Simulations – Simulations (JOB(06)/186)
• Tariff Quota Administration – Communication by the United States (JOB(06)/184)
• Comments on Food Aid (JOB(06)/183)
• Agriculture Domestic Support Simulations – Simulations (JOB(06)/151)
• Applied Tariff Simulations – Agriculture – Summary of Results (JOB(06)/152)
• United States Communication on Special Products (JOB(06)/137)
• United States Communication on Export Credits, Export Credit Guarantees or Insurance Programs (JOB(06)/119)
• United States Communication on State Trading Export Enterprises (JOB(06)/79)
• United States Communication on Domestic Support – Annex 2 – Domestic Support: The Basis for Exemption from the Reduction Commitments (JOB(06)/80)
• United States' Communication on Food Aid (JOB(06)/78)
• Market Access Simulations – Simulations (JOB(06)/63)

Council on Trade in Services, Special Session

• Framework for Negotiation (S/CSS/W/4)
• Proposals for Negotiation (JOB(00)/8376)
• Accounting Services (S/CSS/W/20)
• Audiovisual and Related Services (S/CSS/W/21)
• Distribution Services (S/CSS/W/22)
• Higher (Tertiary) Education, Adult Education and Training (S/CSS/W/23)
• Energy Services (S/CSS/W/24)
• Environmental Services (S/CSS/W/25)
• Express Delivery Services (S/CSS/W/26)
• Financial Services (S/CSS/W/27)
• Legal Services (S/CSS/W/28)
• Movement of Natural Persons (S/CSS/W/29)
• Market Access in Telecommunications and Complementary Services (S/CSS/W/30)
• Tourism and Hotels (S/CSS/W/31)
• Transparency in Domestic Regulation (S/CSS/W/102)
• Advertising and Related Services (S/CSS/W/100)
• Desirability of a Safeguard Mechanism for Services: Promoting Liberalization of Trade in Services (S/WPGR/W/37)
• Modalities for the Special Treatment For Least-Developed Country Members in the Negotiations on Trade In Services – JOB(03)/133
• U.S. Government Points of Contact in Least-Developed Country Members (JOB (03)/33)
• Proposed Guide for Scheduling Commitments on Energy Services in the WTO (JOB(03)/89)
• Small and Medium Sized Enterprises (TN/S/W/5)
• Initial Offer (TN/S/O/USA)
• An Assessment of Services Trade and Liberalization in the United States and Developing Economies (TN/S/W/12)
• Joint Statement on Market Access in Services (JOB(04)/176)
• U.S. Proposal for Transparency Disciplines in Domestic Regulation: Building on Existing International Disciplines and Proposals (JOB(04)/128)
• Communication from the United States: Horizontal Transparency Disciplines in Domestic Regulation (JOB(06)/182)
• Outline of the U.S. position on a Draft Consolidated Text in the WPDR (JOB(06)/223)
• Classification in the Telecommunications Sector under the WTO-GATS Framework (TN/S/W/35 and S/CSC/W/45)
• Guidelines for Scheduling Commitments Concerning Postal and Courier Services, including Express Delivery (TN/S/W/30)
• Joint Statement on Liberalization of Logistics Services (TN/S/W/34)
• Joint Statement on Legal Services (TN/S/W/37 and S/CSC/W/46)
• Legal Services – Objectives for Further Liberalisation and Limitations to be Removed (JOB(05)/276)
• Joint Statement on Liberalization of Construction and Related Engineering Services (JOB(05)/130)
• Joint Statement on Liberalization of Financial Services (JOB(05)/17)
• Working Toward a Productive Information Exchange (in the Working Party on GATS Rules) (JOB(05)/5)
• Statement on Services of Common Interest in the Energy Sector (JOB(06)/17)
• Implementation of the Modalities for the Special Treatment for Least Developed Country Members in the Trade in Services Negotiations (JOB(06)/77)
• Revised Services Offer (TN/S/O/USA/Rev.1)
• Review of Progress in Telecommunications Services (JOB(07)/199)
• Review of Progress in Postal and Courier Services, including Express Delivery Collective Request (JOB(07)/200)

Negotiating Group on Market Access

• Tariffs & Trade Data Needs Assessment (TN/MA/W/2)
• Negotiations on Environmental Goods (TN/MA/W/3 and TN/TE/W/8)
• Modalities Proposal (TN/MA/W/18)
• Proposal on Modalities for Addressing Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs) (TN/MA/W/18/Add.1)
• Revenue Implications of Trade Liberalization (TN/MA/W/18/Add.2)
• Vertical NTB Modality (TN/MA/W/18/Add.3)
• Contribution on an Environmental Goods Modality (TN/TE/W/38) and (TN/MA/W/18/Add.5)
• Liberalizing Trade in Environmental Goods (TN/MA/W/3, TN/MA/W/18/Add.4, Add.5, and Add.7)
• Non-Tariff Barrier Notifications (TN/MA/W/46/Add.8)
• Non-Tariff Barrier Notifications – Revision (TN/MA/W/46/Add.8/Rev.1)
• Non-Agricultural Market Access: Modalities (TN/MA/W/44)
• Contribution by Canada, European Communities and United States, Non-Agricultural Market Access: Modalities (JOB(03)/163)
• Progress Report: Discussions on Forestry NTBs (TN/MA/W/48/Add.1)
• Negotiating NTBs Related to Remanufacturing and Refurbishing (TN/MA/W/18/Add.11)
• A View To Harmonize Textile, Apparel, and Footwear Labeling Requirements (TN/MA/W /18/Add.12)
• Progress Report: WTO NAMA Discussions on Autos NTBs (TN/MA/W/18/Add.9)
• Tariff Elimination in the Gems and Jewelry Sector (TN/MA/W/61)
• Tariff Liberalization in the Forest Products Sector (TN/MA/W/64)
• Tariff Elimination in the Electronics/Electrical Sector (TN/MA/W/59)
• Initial List of Environmental Goods (TN/MA/W/18/Add.7 or TN/TE/W/52)
• Treatment of Non-Ad Valorem Technical Tariffs (TN/MA/W/18/Add.8)
• Tariff Liberalization in the Chemicals Sector (TN/MA/W/58)
• How to Create a Critical Mass Sectoral Initiative (TN/MA/W/55)
• U.S. Proposal on Negotiating NTBs Related to the Auto Sector (TN/MA/W/18/Add.6)
• Non-Tariff Barriers Building Codes and the Wood Products Sector (TN/MA/W/48)
• Non-Tariff Barriers – Requests (TN/MA/NTR/3)
• Tariff Elimination in the Electronics/Electrical Sector (TN/MA/W/69)
• Open Access to Enhanced Healthcare (JOB(06)/35)
• Progress Report: NTB Discussions Related to Remanufactured and Refurbished Goods (TN/MA/W/18/Add.10) and (TN/MA/W/18/Add.10/Corr.1)
• Tariff Liberalisation in the Forest Products Sector1 (TN/MA/W/75)
• Negotiating Text on Textiles, Apparel, Footwear and Travel Goods Labeling Requirements (TN/MA/W/18/Add.14)
• Tariff Liberalization in the Chemicals Sector (TN/MA/W/72)
• Progress Report: Sectoral Discussions on Tariff Elimination in the Chemicals Sector (TN/MA/W/18/Add.1)
• Tariff Elimination in the Electronics/Electrical Sector JOB(06)/85
• Negotiating Proposal on Tariff Liberalisation in the Forest Products Sector JOB(06)/128
• Market Access for Environmental Goods TN/MA/W/70
• Negotiating Proposal on Tariff Elimination in the Gems and Jewellery Sector TN/MA/W/61/Add.2
• Swiss Dual proposal JOB(05)/36
• Analytical Contributions June 2005 JOB(05)/97
• Room Document for Simulation Presentation March 06. Actual doc # unknown.
• Negotiating Text on Liberalizing Trade in Remanufactured Goods (TN/MA/W/18/Add.15)
• Revised U.S. Negotiating Text on Liberalizing Trade in Remanufactured Goods (TN/MA/W/18/Add.16)
• Regulation of Remanufactured Goods: Answers to Frequently Asked Questions (JOB(07)/60)
• Non-Tariff Barriers – Requests (TN/MA/NTR/3/Add.2)
• Proposal for Modifications to "Ministerial Decision on Procedures for the Facilitation of Solutions to Non-Tariff Barriers" (TN/MA/W/88) NTBs (JOB(07)/145)
• Reducing Non-Tariff Barriers to Trade Related to Labeling of Textiles, Apparel, Footwear and Travel Goods – HS Classifications of Travel Goods (JOB(07)/59)
• Reducing Non-Tariff Barriers to Trade Related to Labelling of Textiles, Apparel, Footwear and Travel Goods - U.S. Responses to U.S. Questions (JOB(06)/266/Add.1)
• Non-Tariff Barriers to Trade related to Textiles, Clothing and Footwear – U.S. answers to Questionnaire by the European Communities (JOB(07)/22)




• Communication from the European Communities and the United States on NTBs related to Textiles, Apparel, Footwear and Clothing (TN/MA/W/93)
• Negotiating Text on Liberalizing Trade in Remanufactured Goods (TN/MA/W/18/Add.16/Rev.1)
• Illustrative Examples of Remanufactured Goods (JOB(07)/224)

Negotiating Group on Rules

• Fisheries Subsidies -- Joint communication from the United States, Australia, Chile, Ecuador, Iceland, New Zealand, Peru, and the Philippines (TN/RL/W/3)
• Fisheries Subsidies (TN/RL/W/21)
• OECD Steel Paper (TN/RL/W/24)
• Questions on Papers Submitted to Rules Negotiating Group (TN/RL/W/25)
• Basic Concepts of the Trade Remedies Rules (TN/RL/W/27)
• Special and Differential Treatment and the Subsidies Agreement (TN/RL/W/33)
• Second Set of Questions from the United States on Papers Submitted to the Rules Negotiating Group (TN/RL/W/34)
• Investigatory Procedures Under The Antidumping and Subsidies Agreements (TN/RL/W/35)
• Communication From The United States Attaching A Communiqué From The Organization For Economic Cooperation And Development (OECD) (TN/RL/W/49)
• Circumvention (TN/RL/W/50)
• Replies To Questions Presented To The United States On Submission TN/Rl/W/27 (TN/RL/W/53)
• Third Set Of Questions From The United States On Papers Submitted To The Rules Negotiating Group (TN/RL/W/54)
• Responses By The United States To Questions From Australia On Investigatory Procedures Under The Anti-Dumping And Subsidies Agreements (TN/RL/W/71)
• Identification Of Certain Major Issues Under The Anti-Dumping And Subsidies Agreements (TN/RL/W/72)
• Possible Approaches To Improved Disciplines On Fisheries Subsidies (TN/RL/W/77)
• Subsidies Disciplines Requiring Clarification And Improvement (TN/RL/W/78)
• Elements Of A Steel Subsidies Agreement (TN/RL/W/95)
• Identification of Additional Issues under the Anti-dumping and Subsidies Agreements (TN/RL/W/98)
• Fourth Set Of Questions From The United States On Papers Submitted To The Rules Negotiating Group (TN/RL/W/103)
• Further Issues Identified Under The Anti-Dumping And Subsidies Agreements For Discussion By the Negotiating Group On Rules (TN/RL/W/130)
• Replies to the Questions from India on TN/RL/W/35 (TN/RL/W/147)
• Three Issues Identified by the United States (TN/RL/W/153)
• Accrual of Interest (TN/RL/W/168)
• Additional Views on the Structure of the Fisheries Subsidies Negotiations (TN/RL/W/169)
• Fisheries Subsidies (TN/RL/W/196) (co-sponsored with Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Iceland, New Zealand, Pakistan and Peru)
• Offsets for Non-Dumped Comparisons (TN/RL/W/208)
• Allocation of Subsidy Benefits Over Time (TN/RL/GEN/4)
• Exchange Rates (TN/RL/W/GEN/5)
• New Shipper Reviews (TN/RL/GEN/11)
• Allocation Periods for Subsidy Benefits (TN/RL/GEN/12)
• Prompt Access to Non-Confidential Information (TN/RL/GEN/13)
• Conduct of Verifications (TN/RL/GEN/15)
• All-Others Rate (TN/RL/GEN/16)
• Expensing Versus Allocating Subsidy Benefits (TN/RL/GEN/17/Rev.1)
• Preliminary Determinations (TN/RL/GEN/25)
• Circumvention (TN/RL/GEN/29)
• Fisheries Subsidies – Programmes for Decommissioning of Vessels and Licence Retirement (TN/RL/GEN/41)
• Further Submission on When and How to Allocate Subsidy Benefits Over Time (TN/RL/GEN/45)
• Further Comments on Lesser Duty Proposals (TN/RL/GEN/58)
• Causation (TN/RL/GEN/59)
• Submission on Circumvention (TN/RL/GEN/71)
• Identification of Parties (TN/RL/GEN/89) (co-sponsored with Brazil)
• Access to Non-Confidential Information (TN/RL/GEN/90)
• New Shipper Reviews (TN/RL/GEN/91)
• Expanding the Prohibited "Red Light" Subsidy Category (TN/RL/GEN/94)
• Further Submission on Facts Available (TN/RL/GEN/105)
• Circumvention (TN/RL/GEN/106)
• Exchange Rates (TN/RL/GEN/107)
• Disclosure of Essential Preliminary Legal and Factual Considerations (Mandatory Preliminary Determinations) (TN/RL/GEN/108)
• Fisheries Subsidies (TN/RL/GEN/127)
• Causation (TN/RL/GEN/128)
• Definition of Domestic Industry for Perishable, Seasonal Agricultural Products (TN/RL/GEN/129)
• Allocation and Expensing of Subsidies Benefits (TN/RL/GEN/130)
• Collection of Anti-Dumping Duties under Article 9.3 (TN/RL/GEN/131)
• Conduct of On-the-Spot Investigations (TN/RL/GEN/132)
• Disclosure of Calculations in Preliminary and Final Determinations (TN/RL/GEN/133)
• Fisheries Subsidies: Proposed New Disciplines (TN/RL/GEN/145)
• Expanding the Prohibited Red Light Subsidy Category – Draft Text (TN/RL/GEN/146)
• Proposal on Offsets for Non-Dumped Comparisons (TN/RL/GEN/147)

Committee on Antidumping Practices

• Proposal for Operationalization of Art. 15 (G/ADP/AHG/W/138)
• Draft Recommendation on Operationalizing Art. 15 (G/ADP/AHG/W/143)
• Para. 7.4: Annual Reviews of the Antidumping Agreement (G/ADP/W/427)

Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures

• Approval of Qualifying Requests under SCM Article. 27.4, Joint communication from the United States, Australia, Canada, the EU, Japan and Switzerland (G/SCM/W/521)

Dispute Settlement Body, Special Session

• Contribution of the United States to the Improvement of the Dispute Settlement Understanding of the WTO-Related to Transparency (TN/DS/W/13)
• Negotiations on Improvements And Clarifications of the Dispute Settlement Understanding on Improving Flexibility and Member Control in WTO Dispute Settlement (TN/DS/W/28)
• Further Contribution of The United States to The Improvement of The Dispute Settlement Understanding of the WTO Related to Transparency (TN/DS/W/46)
• Negotiations on Improvements and Clarifications of the Dispute Settlement Understanding on Improving Flexibility and Member Control in WTO Dispute Settlement, Joint communication from United States and Chile (TN/DS/W/52)
• Some Questions for Consideration on Item(f) (TN/DS/W/74)
• Contribution of the United States on Some Practical Considerations in Improving the Dispute Settlement Understanding of the WTO Related to Transparency and Open Meetings (TN/DS/W/79)
• Further Contribution of the United States on Improving Flexibility and Member Control in WTO Dispute Settlement (TN/DS/W/82)
• Further Contribution of the United States on Improving Flexibility and Member Control in WTO Dispute Settlement, Addendum (TN/DS/W/82/Add.1)
• Further Contribution of the United States on Improving Flexibility and Member Control in WTO Dispute Settlement, Addendum, Corrigendum (TN/DS/W/82/Add.1/Corr.1)
• Further Contribution of the United States to the Improvement of the Dispute Settlement Understanding of the WTO Related to Transparency - Revised Legal Drafting (TN/DS/W/86)
• Dispute Settlement Body – Special Session – Negotiations on Improvements and Clarifications of the Dispute Settlement Understanding – Further Contribution of the United States on Improving Flexibility and Member Control – Addendum (TN/DS/W/82/Add.2)
• Flexibility and Member Control – Revised Textual Proposal by Chile and the United States (TN/DS/W/89)

Trade Facilitation

• Article VIII - Fees and Formalities (G/C/W/384)
• Article X - Publication and Administration (G/C/W/400)
• Integrated and Comprehensive Approach to Special and Differential Treatment (G/C/W/451)
• Communication on Trade Facilitation (JOB(04)/103)
• Introduction to Proposals by the United States of America (TN/TF/W/11)
• Advance Binding Rulings (TN/TF/W/12)
• Proposal on Transparency and Publication (TN/TF/W/13)
• Communication from the United States (TN/TF/W/14)
• Express Shipments (TN/TF/W/15)
• Release of Goods (TN/TF/W/21)
• Consularization - Proposal from Uganda and the United States (TN/TF/W/22)
• Multilateral Mechanism – Proposal from India and the United States (TN/TF/W/57)
• United States Assistance on Trade Facilitation (TN/TF/W/71)
• Communication from Australia, Canada and the United States – Draft Text on Advance Rulings (TN/TF/W/125)
• Communication from Uganda and the United States – Consularization (TN/TF/W/86 and Add.1)
• Communication from Uganda and the United States – Consularization (TN/TF/W/104)
• Communication from the United States - Express Shipments (TN/TF/W/91)
• Communication from Chile, Peru, and the United States - Internet Publication (TN/TF/W/89)
• Communication from Australia, Canada, and the United States - Common Elements of Advance Rulings (TN/TF/W/80)


• Communication from the United States – Draft Text on Internet Publication (TN/TF/W/145)
• Communication from the United States – Draft Text on Expedited Shipments (TN/TF/W/144 and Rev.1)
• Communication from the United States -- United States Assistance on Trade Facilitation (TN/TF/W/151)

Committee on Trade and Environment, Regular and Special Session

• Sub-Paragraph 31 (i) of the Doha Declaration – Relationship between existing WTO rules and specific trade obligations set out in Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs) (TN/TE/W/20 and TN/TE/W/40
• Sub-Paragraph 31 (ii) of the Doha Declaration - Procedures for information exchange between MEA Secretariats and relevant WTO committees and criteria for granting MEA observer status (TN/TE/W/5 and TN/TE/W/70)
• Sub-Paragraph 31(iii) of the Doha Declaration – Market access for environmental goods and services (TN/TE/W/8, TN/TE/W/34, TN/TE/W/38, TN/TE/W/52, TN/TE/W/64, TN/TE/W/65, JOB(06)140 and JOB(06)169, JOB(07)/54, and JOB(07)193)
• Paragraph 33 of the Doha Declaration (WT/CTE/W/227)

Six dual submissions on Environmental Goods to the Committee on Trade and Environment Special Session and the Negotiating Group on Market Access are also listed under the Negotiating Group on Market Access.

Council on TRIPS, Regular & Special Session

• Questions and Answers: Comparison of Proposals (TN/IP/W/1)
• Issues for Discussion, Article 23.4 (TN/IP/W/2)
• Proposal for a Multilateral System of Registration and Protection of Geographic Indications for Wine & Spirits Based on Article 23.4 of the TRIPS Agreement (TN/IP/W/5)
• Multilateral System of Registration and Protection of Geographic Indications for Wine & Spirits (TN/IP/W/6)
• Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health (IP/C/W/340)
• Second Submission on Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health (IP/C/W/358)
• Implications of Article 23 Extension (IP/C/W/386)
• Moratorium to Address Needs of Developing and Least-Developed Members with No or Insufficient Manufacturing Capacities in the Pharmaceutical Sector (IP/C/W/396)
• Joint Proposal for a Multilateral System of Notification and Registration of Geographical Indications for Wines and Spirits (TN/IP/W/9)
• Article 27.3(B), Relationship between the TRIPS Agreement and the CBD, and the Protection of Traditional Knowledge and Folklore (IP/C/W/434)
• Technology Transfer Practices of the U.S. National Cancer Institute's Departmental Therapeutics Program (IP/C/W/341)
• Access to Genetic Resources: Regime of the United States’ National Parks (IP/C/W/393)
• Proposed Draft TRIPS Council Decision on the Establishment of a Multilateral System of Notification and Registration of Geographical Indications for Wines and Spirits (TN/IP/W/10 and Add.1)
• Article 27.3(B), Relationship between the TRIPS Agreement and the CBD and the Protection of Traditional Knowledge and Folklore (IP/C/W/449)
• Comments on Implementation of the 30 August 2003 Agreement (Solution) on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health (IP/C/W/444)
• Relationship between the TRIPS Agreement and the CBD, and the Protection of Traditional Knowledge and Folklore (IP/C/W/469)

Committee on Trade and Development, Special Session

• Remarks on the Review of Special and Differential Treatment (TN/CTD/W/9)
• Monitoring Mechanism (TN/CTD/W/19)
• Approach to Agreement-Specific Proposals (TN/CTD/W/27)

Working Group on Transparency in Government Procurement

• Capacity Building Questions (WT/WGTGP/W/34)
• Workplan Proposal (WT/WGTGP/W/35)
• Considerations Related to Enforcement of an Agreement on Transparency in Government Procurement (WT/WGTGP/W/38)

Work Program on Electronic Commerce

• Work Program on Electronic Commerce (WT/GC/W/493/Rev.1)

Working Group on the Relationship between Trade and Investment

• Covering FDI & Portfolio Investment in an Agreement (WT/WGTI/W/142)

Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy

• Technical Assistance (WT/WGTCP/W/185)
• Hardcore Cartels (WT/WGTCP/W/203)
• Voluntary Cooperation (WT/WGTCP/W/204)
• Transparency & Non-discrimination (WT/WGTCP/W/218)
• Procedural Fairness (WT/WGTCP/W/219)
• The Benefits of Peer Review in the WTO Competition Context (WT/WGTCP/W/233)
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