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World Trade Organization |
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WT/TPR/S/166 29 May 2006 | |
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(06-2489) |
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Trade Policy Review Body |
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TRADE POLICY REVIEW TOGO Report by the Secretariat |
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This report, prepared for the second Trade Policy Review of Togo, has been drawn up by the WTO Secretariat on its own responsibility. The Secretariat has, as required by the Agreement establishing the Trade Policy Review Mechanism (Annex 3 of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization), sought clarification from Togo on its trade policies and practices. Any technical questions arising from this report may be addressed to Mr Jacques Degbelo (022 739 55 83). Document WT/TPR/G/166 contains the policy statement submitted by Togo. |
Note: This report is subject to restricted circulation and press embargo until the end of the first session of the meeting of the Trade Policy Review Body on Togo.
CONTENTS
Page
SUMMARY OBSERVATIONS vii
(1) Economic Environment vii
(2) Trade and Investment Regime viii
(3) Trade Policy Instruments viii
(4) Sectoral Policies ix
(5) Trade Policy and Trade Partners x
I. Economic environment 1
(1) Major Features of the Economy 1
(2) Recent Economic Developments 3
(3) Trends in trade and Investment 4
(4) Outlook 6
II. TRADE AND INVESTMENT REGIME 9
(1) General Context 9
(2) Policy Objectives 12
(3) Trade Agreements and Arrangements 13
(i) The WTO 13
(ii) Regional agreements 14
(4) Investment 20
(i) Investment Code 20
(ii) Free zones 20
(iii) Investment treaties and agreements 22
ANNEX II.1: TRADE-RELATED TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE 23
(1) Implementation of Agreements, Training and Policy Formulation 23
(2) Supply-Side Constraints 24
(3) Integration of Trade in Development Strategies 25
III. trade policies and practices by measure 26
(1) Introduction 26
(2) Measures Directly Affecting Imports 26
(i) Registration 26
(ii) Customs procedures 27
(iii) Rules of origin 28
(iv) Customs levies 29
(v) Prohibitions, quantitative restrictions and licences 34
(vi) Sanitary and phytosanitary measures (SPS) 35
(vii) Standardization, accreditation and certification 36
(viii) Rules on packaging, marking and labelling 37
(ix) Contingency measures 37
(x) Other measures 37
Page
(3) Measures Directly Affecting Exports 37
(i) Registration and documentation 37
(ii) Export duties and taxes 37
(iii) Export prohibitions, restrictions, controls and licences 38
(iv) Export subsidies, promotion and assistance 38
(4) Measures Affecting Production and Trade 39
(i) Protection of intellectual property rights 39
(ii) Competition policy 42
(iii) Incentives 43
(iv) State trading, State-owned enterprises and privatization 43
(v) Government procurement 45
IV. TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTICES BY SECTOR 47
(1) Introduction 47
(2) Agriculture, Livestock, Fisheries and Forestry 48
(i) Overview 48
(ii) Agricultural policy 49
(iii) Policy by subsector 50
(3) Mining, Energy and Water 53
(i) Mining products 53
(ii) Petroleum products and natural gas 55
(iii) Electricity 56
(iv) Water 58
(4) Manufacturing 58
(5) Services 60
(i) Overview 60
(ii) Transport 60
(iii) Tourism 63
(iv) Post and telecommunications 64
(v) Financial services 66
REFERENCES 69
APPENDIX TABLES 73
CHARTS
Page
I. Economic environment
I.1 Structure of merchandise trade, 1998-2004 7
I.2 Direction of merchandise trade, 1998-2004 8
III. trade policies and practices by measure
III.1 Distribution of applied MFN duties, 2005 31
III.2 Escalation of applied MFN tariff rates, 2005 33
TABLES
I. Economic environment
I.1 Basic macroeconomic indicators, 1998-2004 2
I.2 Breakdown of GDP by sector, 1998 and 2005 3
I.3 Balance of payments, 1998-2003 5
II. TRADE AND INVESTMENT REGIME
II.1 Togo's principal trade-related laws and regulations, April 2006 10
II.2 Free zone statistics, 1999-2004 21
III. trade policies and practices by measure
III.1 MFN tariff structure, 1998 and 2005 30
III.2 Customs tariff according to degree of processing, 1998 and 2005 31
III.3 Special tax on beverage manufacture and marketing, 2005 34
III.4 Exemptions from MFN duties, 1999-2003 34
III.5 Subjects and terms of protection under the Bangui Agreement (1997) and its revision (1999) 40
III.6 Togo and the intellectual property protection treaties administered by WIPO, 2006 42
III.7 List of state-owned enterprises, 1997 and March 2006 44
IV. TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTICES BY SECTOR
IV.1 Production of the main food crops, 1998-2005 seasons 49
IV.2 Cotton production, 1998-2005 seasons 51
IV.3 Production and exports by the major manufacturing enterprises in Togo (customs territory) 59
IV.4 Goods traffic by country, 2004-2005 61
IV.5 Tourism indicators, 1999-2005 64
IV.6 Telecommunications services indicators, 1999-2003 64
IV.7 Basic data on decentralized financing schemes, 2002-2004 67
APPENDIX TABLES
Page
I. Economic environment
AI.1 Structure of exports, 1998-2004 75
AI.2 Structure of exports (including re-exports), 1998-2004 77
AI.3 Destination of exports, 1998-2004 79
AI.4 Destination of exports (including re-exports), 1998-2004 80
AI.5 Structure of imports, 1998-2004 81
AI.6 Origin of imports, 1998-2004 83
III. trade policies and practices by measure
AIII.1 Import duties by hs chapter, 2005 84
AIII.2 Summary analysis of the MFN tariff, 2005 87
IV. TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTICES BY SECTOR
AIV.1 MFN tariff by ISIC category, 2005 88
(1) Economic Environment
1. The socio-political crisis ongoing in Togo since 1992 has an impact on the country's economic performance and, consequently, its development. Since the previous trade policy review (TPR) in 1999, Togo's economic growth in real terms has been modest (an annual average of around 1.1 per cent over the period 1999-2003), real GDP, per capita has declined, and poverty has increased. Togo is a least developed country (LDC) and, according to the UNDP, it is 143rd (of 177 countries) in the Human Development Index classification.
2. Despite lack of external financing, Togo has moved ahead with its macro-economic stabilization and structural reform programme. The restrictive monetary policy followed by the Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO) has enabled inflation to be contained in spite of the pressures recently felt as a result of the high cost of petroleum products and foodstuffs. The basic fiscal balance (including grants) went from a deficit in 1999 to a surplus in 2003, before declining sharply in 2005. In addition to the reforms, part of the reason for the budgetary performance is to be found in the accumulation of arrears in internal and external payments.
3. As the business climate in Togo is notably sluggish, there is no flow of private investment, whether foreign or Togolese. The instability of the banking system does not allow businesses to obtain financing. Togo's economy therefore remains dependent on the agricultural sector (some 38.2 per cent of nominal GDP in 2005 and the major source of income and jobs for 63 per cent of the population). It is subsistence agriculture and is thus essentially informal, with the main cash crops being cotton, followed by coffee and cocoa. Overall, the informal sector accounts for some 68 per cent of economic activity and is responsible for about one third of turnover in business and transport.
4. The manufacturing sector is one of the few economic activities that has to some extent withstood the crisis in Togo. The growth in activities in the free zone, which has the advantage of being close to the Autonomous Port of Lomé (PAL), has offset the decline in phosphate-related activities. Cement produced in the free zone became Togo's leading export in 2001, followed by cotton and phosphates. Goods imports chiefly consist of petroleum products, food products, machinery and transport vehicles. The long-standing deficit in the trade balance has become even more marked since the first review of Togo's trade policy (TPR), even though exports (in f.o.b. terms) have recently increased.
5. The services sector is still the largest, accounting for 47.6 per cent of GDP in 2005. Services related to transit trade with countries in the subregion (Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger) have expanded since the previous TPR because of the reorganization of traffic in West Africa resulting from the crisis in Côte d'Ivoire. Nevertheless, more goods transport-related services such as freight and insurance have been imported, thus increasing the services deficit.
6. As Togo's relations with development partners are still being normalized, Togo has been unable to benefit from the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative or multilateral and bilateral development aid, unlike other LDCs. In 2004, Togo's outstanding internal and external debt/nominal GDP ratio was 96.5 per cent. Normalization of relations between Togo and donors requires that it comply with the commitments it has undertaken, in particular the holding of early parliamentary elections. Normalization would allow Togo to complete the preparation of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) commenced in 2004 and so obtain the support of its development partners in reinforcing its macro-economic stabilization and structural reform programme (by eliminating the constraints on the supply of basic services such as water, electricity and telecommunications and continuing the State's withdrawal from economic activities).
(2) Trade and Investment Regime
7. In Togo, the Ministry of Commerce is responsible for drawing up trade and investment policy (with the exception of that concerning the free zone). There is no regular collaboration with other government institutions and agencies because the necessary interministerial administrative structure does not exist. The private sector may be consulted through its representative, the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Togo (CCIT).
8. Togo took over the status of GATT Contracting Party and is an original Member of the WTO. It grants most-favoured-nation (MFN) treatment as a minimum to all its trade partners. It has not signed any of the plurilateral agreements concluded within the WTO or the agreements reached since the end of the Uruguay Round.
9. Within the multilateral trading system, Togo shares the concerns of West African cotton-producing countries regarding the decline in income from cotton as a result of the downward trend in global prices and it supports the sectoral initiative in favour of cotton in the WTO. The fact that Togo does not have a mission in Geneva is a hindrance to its participation in the WTO. It does not take part in the Integrated Framework or the JITAP; further technical assistance is sought by the authorities in order to build human resource capacity, particularly in trade-related areas. Togo participates in the WTO's ministerial meetings and, in general, supports the positions of the LDCs and the African Group as regards the Doha Development Agenda.
10. Togo belongs to the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU), which introduced a common external tariff (CET) in 2000. All the members of the WAEMU also belong to the larger Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), whose CET should come into effect by the end of 2007 in accordance with the timetable set for the implementation of the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) with the European Union, planned for January 2008.
11. The free zone is currently the only investment regime. It attracts enterprises by promoting its proximity to the PAL and by offering various incentives. In the near future, Togo intends to adopt an investment regime to promote manufacturing within its customs territory.
(3) Trade Policy Instruments
12. The introduction of the WAEMU's Common External Tariff (CET) in January 2000 reduced Togo's simple average applied MFN tariff rate from 16.5 per cent in 1998 to 12.1 per cent in 2005, and this has to a certain extent liberalized the trade regime, particularly for non-agricultural products (WTO definition). The relatively high level of protection given to agricultural products is detrimental to their competitiveness on foreign markets (particularly in the case of processed agricultural products). Moreover, agricultural products are an important component of household spending, particularly for those in the low-income bracket, and this high rate of taxation means that households have to spend more. During the Uruguay Round, Togo (like other Members) bound its tariffs on all agricultural products and some non-agricultural products at a ceiling of 80 per cent.
13. Apart from customs duties, goods released for consumption are subject to several other duties and taxes: the statistical fee (RS) of 1 per cent (3 per cent when Togo's trade policy was first reviewed in 1999), which applies to goods of any origin; the WAEMU's Community solidarity levy, applicable to goods of non-WAEMU origin at a rate of 1 per cent (assessed and collected for the WAEMU's account); the ECOWAS Community levy applicable to goods of non-ECOWAS origin at a rate equal in practice to 1 per cent; the charge for the inspection and verification of imported goods (RVI), applicable to goods of any origin at a rate of 0.75 per cent. These various charges bring the simple average of import duties and charges (including customs duties) to 15.85 per cent. Internal taxes are also levied at the customs, for example, value added tax (18 per cent), as well as excise duty on certain products (including alcoholic beverages and petroleum products). Togo has never had recourse to contingency measures.
14. Changes to customs procedures have involved, inter alia, computerization (some 93 per cent of import procedures were computerized in 2005, compared with 80 per cent at the time of the first review in 1999). The Government still gives the company COTECNA responsibility for preshipment inspection and its fees are partly met through a levy. Togo is experiencing problems in applying the WTO Customs Valuation Agreement. It allows local (unprocessed) and handicrafts products, as well as manufactures that have received the necessary approval and originate in WAEMU or ECOWAS member countries, to enter completely free of duty. In practice, only a small proportion of Togo's exports are given such regional preferences because products from the free zone, such as cement, are not eligible for them.
15. Togo imposes import prohibitions for sanitary, phytosanitary, environmental or security reasons or under international agreements it has signed. There is a WAEMU initiative aimed at raising the quality of products, especially those for export. For food security reasons, however, since 1995, Togo has not allowed cereals (or in practice any food crops) to be exported. The free zone regime offers exporters a wide range of incentives such as financing to cover the cost of inputs and transport, fiscal exemptions and exchange freedom.
16. Intellectual property is protected in Togo, notably under the revised Bangui Agreement. Togo's copyright and related rights legislation is obsolete and needs to be brought up to date. The same applies to competition legislation. The government procurement regime remains virtually unchanged; government procurement contracts are usually awarded following an open invitation to bid.
17. Togo has expanded its privatization programme since the previous TPR, but the State is still closely involved in formal economic activities, particularly in the services sector (financial, post and telecommunications, port, and hotel and restaurant services). The programme has mainly led to concessions being given for certain hotels and the total or partial transfer of some enterprises. The State does not have the resources to invest in restructuring the remaining State-owned enterprises still operating and without an inflow of foreign capital their performance is unsatisfactory.
(4) Sectoral Policies
18. Alleviating poverty in Togo implies development of the agricultural sector. The national agricultural policy was drawn up in 1996 and gives priority to food security; therefore, farmers are obliged to sell their food crops (including cereals) solely on the domestic market as export is banned.
19. The volume of exports of cotton, Togo's principal cash crop, has increased by 276 per cent since the previous TPR, highlighting Togo's comparative advantages in this subsector. During the same period, however, the revenue earned from exports of cotton lint (in CFA franc terms) fell by 7.9 per cent. This performance can be explained by the low global price in dollars and the latter's depreciation vis-à-vis the euro, to which the CFA franc is pegged. The Togo Cotton Company (SOTOCO), a State-owned company that is the leading operator in the subsector, no longer has a monopoly of cotton ginning, but is still the only company allowed to buy seed cotton from producers.
20. For a long time, the major part of Togo's earnings came from the export of phosphates, but the crisis in this subsector persists. Consequently, phosphate production continues its downward trend. In addition to phosphates, only limestone (to be used to produce cement) is exploited on an industrial scale in Togo; gold and diamonds are mined on a small scale. The Mining Code has been revised in order, inter alia, to meet the Kimberley Process criteria. There is a new Hydrocarbons Code, drawn up after the discovery of hydrocarbons potential; Togo does not yet produce hydrocarbons and is therefore vulnerable to the negative impact of soaring global prices for hydrocarbons products. Because they are controlled in Togo, domestic prices for petroleum products do not systematically shadow global prices. Average tariff protection in the mining sector fell from 6.3 per cent in 1998 to 5.2 per cent in 2005.
21. The manufacturing sector is not very developed. With the exception of enterprises in the free zone, the majority of whose production is exported, manufacturing industries in Togo produce commodities such as beverages, soap, bread and plastic bags chiefly for the domestic market. The relatively high cost of inputs, attributable, inter alia, to the fairly strong protection given to agricultural commodities, is not conducive to the competitiveness of Togo's processed products on foreign markets. Furthermore, the following also has to be taken into account: the marked escalation of customs tariffs in certain industries and, as a result, their strong effective protection; high costs and shortcomings in the supply of basic services, particularly financial, post and telecommunications, and transport services and electricity and water. The benefits given to enterprises in the free zone to some extent offset these obstacles but do not cancel them out. Average tariff protection in the manufacturing sector is 12.2 per cent, compared with close to 17 per cent in 1998.
22. Commercially traded services such as business and transport are, to a certain extent, boosted by port activities. The PAL remains one of Togo's major assets, handling goods in transit to a number of countries in the Sahel. Togo's land transport infrastructure does not, however, enable it to take full advantage of
this asset. The PAL is still an autonomously managed State-owned enterprise; in 2001, handling in the Port was put out to concession. Teledensity has increased sharply in the case of mobile telephones since the previous TPR (partly) because of the introduction of competition for the supply of these services in Togo in 2000. The availability, quality and cost of basic services are still unsatisfactory. The authorities are considering privatizing the traditional operator, Togo Telecom, which has a monopoly of basic services, and its mobile telephone subsidiary.
23. The State is still closely involved in banking; six of the 10 banks in Togo are semi-public companies included in the State's privatization programme. They do not have the positive net equity that would enable them to comply with the rules in force. Micro-credit has expanded following the introduction of a national regulatory framework in 1996 and it meets some of the needs of Togo's craftsmen, farmers and small businessmen. Insurance services are not highly developed, with the exception of import-export and motor vehicle insurance. Furthermore, tourism in Togo has declined since 1998 and is little developed as far as holidays and leisure are concerned, even though Togo has considerable assets in this respect. Togo has made commitments under the GATS in recreational, cultural and sporting services, and construction and related engineering services. The authorities explain that these were the areas which they had determined were a priority for attracting foreign direct investment at the time of the Uruguay Round. This priority should have changed, particularly with the expansion of the bank privatization programme
(5) Trade Policy and Trade Partners
24. Socio-political stability is essential if Togo is to undertake the ambitious reforms that could be supported by the international community and allow it to take full advantage of its potential, as well as to derive greater benefits from its membership in the WTO and
regional forums. The socio-political situation partly explains Togo's modest participation in the WTO.
25. In preparing for the normalization of its relations with the international community, Togo would gain from pursuing its reforms, including structural reform, and intensifying its multilateral commitments on trade in goods and services so as to create a business-friendly
climate (by lowering production costs) and make its trade regime more transparent, more credible and more predictable. Such efforts should be supported by the international community without any problem once socio-political stability has been restored in Togo; its various partners will undoubtedly facilitate access to their markets for goods and services of interest to Togo and respond favourably to its requests for technical assistance.
