I.                   THE UNITED STATES IN THE MULTILATERAL SYSTEM

1.                   The United States remains steadfast in its support of the rules-based multilateral trading system of the World Trade Organization (WTO).  As a key architect of the postwar trading system and a leader in the pursuit of successive trade liberalizations, the U.S. shares a common purpose with our WTO partners:  expanding economic opportunities to the world’s citizens by reducing trade barriers.  The successful completion of the seven multilateral trade rounds following the establishment of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and the launch in 2001of the Doha Development Round, stands as a testament to the power and durability of this shared purpose.  This was confirmed in a recent statement published by the Bretton Woods institutions: “...collectively reducing barriers is the single most powerful tool that countries, working together, can deploy to reduce poverty and raise living standards.”

2.                   Since the launch of the Doha Development Round in 2001, the United States has formally tabled seventy submissions to dramatically reduce barriers to trade in services, agricultural products and industrial goods, and to strengthen the rules and disciplines of the WTO system.  The market access related negotiations of the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) offer the greatest potential to create jobs, advance economic reform and development, and reduce poverty worldwide.  The United States recognizes there are many important issues in the national economic strategies of our developing country WTO partners, yet believes the focus of the WTO must remain concentrated on its mandate of reducing trade barriers and providing a stable, predictable, rules-based environment for world trade.  As the experience at the Fifth Ministerial Conference in Cancun clearly showed, this is work that requires the focus, flexibility and political will of all Members.  The United States is prepared to meet these requirements in order to reach an ambitious outcome in the DDA negotiations.

3.                   The fundamental features of U.S. trade policy -- maintenance of an open, competitive market at home, compliance with WTO obligations, and leadership in the multilateral trading system -- are unchanged despite challenging economic times.  Over the period of review, the U.S. faced a recession followed by a moderate recovery, with job loss and worsening economic conditions abroad throughout.  The U.S. response has been continued leadership in trade liberalization, maintenance of an open market and strong macroeconomic policy action to restore growth at home and to help avoid an even greater worsening of economic conditions abroad.  U.S. leadership in global trade liberalization was bolstered domestically by the renewal of the Executive-Congressional partnership embodied in Trade Promotion Authority in 2002. This legislation re-established special procedures to implement comprehensive trade agreements.

4.                   Despite a reflective stance following Cancun, the objectives agreed in Doha remain a priority in U.S. liberalization efforts.  The WTO’s mandate to reduce barriers and to provide a stable trading system in order to raise standards of living and reduce poverty continue to be an essential element of the broader international economic landscape.  Given its magnitude and scope, the potential of the DDA to transform world trade commands such priority attention.  As part of its broader efforts to liberalize trade, but still within the scope of WTO rules, the U.S. is pursuing several regional and bilateral initiatives for free trade areas.  The U.S. view that regional and bilateral agreements can act as an incubator and catalyst for multilateral liberalization is not new.  Between 1934 and 1945, the United States entered into thirty-two reciprocal trade agreements, many of which had clauses that foreshadowed those currently in the GATT.  It is notable that a recent IMF study of U.S. trade agreements concluded the U.S. model for bilateral and regional trade agreements meets many of the criteria for ensuring these agreements yield the greatest possible benefits.

 

5.                   The United States plays an important role in fostering the further integration of developing countries into the multilateral trading system.  The United States supports efforts to increase the transparency of the negotiations and to allow for the effective participation of all WTO Members in the DDA.  In support of developing country participation in the negotiations, as well as the development and implementation of trade policies within developing countries, the United States has contributed more than $3 million to the WTO for trade-related technical assistance since the DDA launch in November 2001.  The United States also supports the Integrated Framework (IF), both through contributions to the IF Trust Fund and parallel bilateral activities in several least developed countries.  To enhance market access opportunities for beneficiary countries the United States provides duty-free access for most products from developing countries through several preferential trade programs.  These programs include the Generalized System of Preferences, the African Growth and Opportunity Act, the Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act and the Andean Trade Preference and Drug Eradication Program.

6.                   The United States maintains various programs to engender domestic support for open international trade policies.  An important way the United States ensures critical domestic support for its trade policies is through extensive solicitation of input and advice from the public on key negotiations, as well as extensive outreach through a large network of congressionally mandated advisory committees[1].  Representatives on these advisory committees are drawn from the business and agricultural communities, as well as labor, environmental, consumer and other domestic groups.  Such involvement enables development of trade liberalization policies that support protection of the environment and other goals.  Another element in maintaining domestic support for trade liberalization is the Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) program.  TAA, which was expanded and reformed by TAA Reform Act of 2002, provides transitional assistance to workers adversely affected by foreign trade through the provision of re-employment services, including skills training for displaced workers, income support while in training and job search and relocation assistance.  Important changes to the program under the TAA Reform Act of 2002 include expanded eligibility to more worker groups, increased benefits and tax credits for health insurance coverage assistance.

7.                   As noted above, the United States steadfastly supports the multilateral trading system of the WTO.  An important element of this support is the recognition that the system, and the WTO, is a work in progress.  Members, therefore, must take responsibility for important institutional improvements.  The United States will continue to press for increased transparency in WTO operations, in WTO negotiations and in Members’ trade policies.  The WTO needs to expand public access to dispute settlement proceedings, to circulate panel decisions promptly, to encourage more exchange with outside organizations and continue to encourage timely and accurate reporting by Members.

II.                THE UNITED STATES ECONOMIC AND TRADE ENVIRONMENT

Trade policy

8.                   The United States is committed to pursuing open market policies at home and the negotiation of agreements further liberalizing U.S. and global trade.  The United States is fully committed to achieving such liberalization through the WTO-based multilateral trading system, complemented by bilateral and regional free trade agreements.  The United States, together with other WTO members, launched the Doha Development Negotiations just 9 weeks after the terrorist attacks on the United States of September 11, 2001.  The launch under those circumstances bears witness to the United States commitment to and hopes for the WTO-based multilateral trading system.

9.                   The current U.S. simple average tariff is 3.6 percent on a legally bound basis under the WTO.  When GSP and other preferences are taken into account, the U.S. trade weighted average tariff is just 1.6 percent on an applied basis.  After the full implementation of Uruguay Round commitments in 2004, the U.S. bound and applied tariff averages are expected to fall further.  Last year 66 percent of all U.S. imports (including under preference programs) entered the United States duty free.  U.S. service markets are open to competition and U.S. regulatory processes are transparent and accessible to the public.

Growth

10.               After strong economic growth in the late 1990s, the United States experienced a short recession from March 2001 to November 2001.  On a year-over-year basis, U.S. real gross domestic product (GDP) in 2001 increased by just 0.3 percent.  The increase in 2002 was 2.4 percent, a modest rate for the first year of economic recovery and one that left a considerable gap between actual and potential GDP as well as slack in labor markets.  The pace picked up in 2003's first three quarters, with a 2.7 percent increase over the corresponding period of 2002.  Notable was the quickening of growth during 2003 with the year’s second quarter expanding at a 3.3 percent annualized rate relative to the first and with an annualized growth rate of 8.2 percent in the third quarter, the most rapid in the United States in 20 years.  At the same time, inflation continued to be subdued with the GDP price deflator increasing by 2.4 percent in 2001, by 1.1 percent in 2002 and 1.6 percent in 2003s’ first three quarters.

11.               As a result of both the response of the economy’s fiscal stabilizers to the recession, and of discretionary fiscal policy measures aimed at restoring economic growth, the U.S. government budget balance shifted to deficit during the period of review.  In the year prior to the review period, 2000, the United States recorded a budget surplus of $206.9 billion or 2.1 percent of GDP.  The surplus fell to $72.0 billion in 2001, or 0.7 percent of GDP.  Last year, the balance turned into a deficit of $202.1 billion, or 1.9 percent of GDP.  In 2003, the budget deficit is expected to be larger.

Saving

12.               Largely because of the impact of the recession and the slow recovery on federal and sub-federal budget positions, national saving in the United States fell from 18.4 percent of GDP in 2000 to 15.0 percent in 2002.  Gross government saving declined from $435.8 billion in 2000 to negative saving of $24.5 billion in 2002.  Private saving, however, increased from $1.4 trillion in 2000 to $1.6 trillion in 2002.  The recession and the early recovery were characterized by weak investment -- gross government investment fell from $2.08 trillion in 2000 to $1.95 trillion in 2002.  The decline in U.S. gross savings, however, exceeded the more modest reduction in gross private domestic and government investment, resulting in a change in the U.S. net foreign investment, from a net inflow to the United States $395.8 billion in 2000 to $488.9 billion in 2002 (account taken of statistical discrepancies).

13.               In the first three quarters of 2003, gross saving weakened further to 13.8 percent of GDP.  Gross private domestic and government investment, however increased to $2.0 trillion (annualized) in the first three quarters of 2003.  As a result, the net inflow of foreign investment to the United States increased to $562.0 billion.

Labor Markets

14.               After a period of strong growth, the U.S. domestic recession and slow initial recovery took their toll on U.S. employment levels.  Non-farm employment peaked at 132.45 million in December 2000, declining to an apparent trough of 129.9 million in July 2003, a reduction of 2.6 million employed workers in a little over two and one half years.  Between July and November of 2003, however, a 328,000 net increase in employment occurred as the pace of recovery quickened.  These employment developments were reflected in changes in rates of unemployment of the U.S. work force.  The unemployment rate was 3.9 percent in December 2000, the low for the previous business cycle.  The rate rose to what appears to be a peak of 6.4 percent in June 2003. It subsequently began declining, reaching 5.9 percent in November 2003.

15.               The net loss of U.S. employment since 2000 can be accounted for entirely by the loss of manufacturing jobs.  Manufacturing employment stood at 14.5 million in October 2003, 2.6 million less than in December 2000.  Since July 2000 when manufacturing output peaked, the United States has lost 2.8 million manufacturing jobs, a 16 percent reduction.  The principal causes of the job loss appear to be the reduction in manufacturing output associated with the recent recession (which was sharper than that of overall output) and strong growth in U.S. labor productivity.  Manufacturing output, according to the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank, peaked in June 2000, completing a nine-year long increase of 63 percent in the preceding economic expansion.  Manufacturing output reached its trough in December 2001, completing a 6.8 percent reduction from its peak a year and a half earlier.  Between December 2001 and October 2003 (latest available data), a modest, halting advance made up little more than one quarter of the production loss that occurred in the second half of 2000 and in 2001.  The recession was thus sharper for manufacturing than for the overall economy, as is often the case, helping to concentrate U.S. job loss in the manufacturing sector.

16.               Services employment currently accounts for 83 percent of U.S. non-agricultural employment.  Since 2000, services employment has increased by more than one million jobs, even as overall employment declined.  In fact, since 1993 service jobs have accounted for slightly more than all net new employment in the U.S. economy.

Productivity

17.               With performance of employment lagging that of output over the past few years, U.S. manufacturing labor productivity, extending the resurgence of the late 1990s, has continued to grow strongly since 2000.  Between the last quarter of 2000 and the third quarter of 2003 real output-per-hour worked in U.S. manufacturing grew at an average annual compound rate of 4.3 percent.  This compares to an average rate of 3.0 percent for the period 1985-1997.  While strong productivity growth is a source of living standard improvement, it also meant that for U.S. manufacturing to have simply maintained its 1998 or 2000 level of employment would have required strong sustained growth in output.

18.               Even more striking than the productivity developments in manufacturing have been those in the much broader overall U.S. business economy, dominated by service employment.  In the reference period of 1985-1997, productivity growth in the U.S. overall business sector, at 1.6 percent a year, was just over one-third the rate for manufacturing.  Since the later 1990s the gap has disappeared with the convergence occurring at high rates of productivity growth.  Between the last quarter of 2000 and the third quarter of 2003, the annual productivity growth rate for the overall U.S. business economy, at 4.3 percent, matched that of manufacturing and was more than 2.5 times greater than in the reference period of 1985 through 1997.

19.               The continuation of the stronger U.S. productivity growth that was a hallmark of the U.S. economic resurgence in the second half of the 1990s is one of the most positive elements of U.S. economic performance during the period under review.  As is well known, rising labor productivity is perhaps the central factor underlying improvements in the material standard of living.  Many factors could be mentioned to help account for the U.S. productivity resurgence, technological advance, most notably.  It is appropriate to note in the U.S. trade policy review that the U.S. commitment to open markets and the fulfillment of our WTO obligations have contributed importantly to competition in the U.S. market, to the efficiency with which the United States employs current resources and invests for the future, and to strong U.S. productivity growth and higher living standards.

Business Investment

20.               As the growth of business investment (non-residential fixed investment in structures, equipment and software) played an important role in the last U.S. economic expansion, its decline has been a hallmark of the 2001 recession and its aftermath.  From its peak in the second quarter of 2000, business investment fell by 12.6 percent to its trough in the first quarter of 2003.  Investment in structures fell by 24.7 percent;  investment in equipment and software fell by 8.2 percent.  Reflecting the strengthening of growth prospects in 2003, a 6.4 percent increase in fixed investment in equipment and software between the first and third quarter led a revival of business investment (up 5.2 percent overall between the two quarters).

Exports, Imports, and Trade Balance

21.               The economic recession in 2001, and the relatively modest pace of economic expansion in the early recovery phase, has affected U.S. imports.  Exports of the United States were likewise affected by weak rates of economic expansion in many of our major trade partners since 2000.  From 2000 to 2002, U.S. real imports of goods and services increased just 0.7 percent while real exports of goods and services fell by 6.9 percent.  That picture is somewhat less somber if the comparison since 2000 is extended to the third quarter of 2003, as stronger growth, particularly in the United States quickened the growth of trade.  U.S. real goods and services imports show a 4.7 percent increase from 2000 to 2003's third quarter, while U.S. exports show a decline of 4.7 percent.

22.               In nominal terms, U.S. imports of goods and services totaled $1.44 trillion in 2002 while exports totaled $1.01 trillion.  As a share of nominal GDP, U.S. imports of goods and services fell from 14.9 percent in 2000 to 13.8 percent in 2002.  The export share fell from 11.2 percent of nominal GDP in 2000 to 9.7 percent in 2002.  The U.S. trade deficit in goods and services increased from $365.5 billion in 2000, or 3.7 percent of U.S. nominal GDP, to $423.8 billion or 4.1 percent of GDP in 2002. 

23.               As U.S. growth quickened in 2003, absolutely and relative to many U.S. trade partners, the import share of GDP grew again, to 14.2 percent of GDP in 2003s’ first three quarters or $1.54 trillion annualized.  Exports increased slightly to $1.04 trillion (annualized) in the first three quarters of 2003, falling slightly, however, as a share of GDP to 9.6 percent.  As a result the U.S. goods and services trade deficit increased from 4.1 percent of GDP in 2002 to 4.6 percent of GDP in 2003's first three quarters.

24.               The restoration of stronger growth, in the economies of other WTO members as well as the United States, can be expected to stimulate global trade and the exports as well as imports of the United States.

Conclusion

25.               The United States remains firmly committed to the WTO-based multilateral trading system and shares with other Members the hope for further significant liberalization of trade through the WTO.  The strengthening and further opening of global markets to trade through a successful conclusion to the DDA negotiations and other trade liberalizing efforts should support global economic recovery and the income-increasing expansion of world trade for low-, middle-, and high-income countries alike.

III.             TRADE POLICY DEVELOPMENTS, 2001-2003

(1)               WTO Agreements and Initiatives

(i)                 U.S. Proposals in the Doha Development Agenda

26.               At the launch of the Doha Round in November 2001, U.S. Trade Representative Robert B. Zoellick stated, "Our work here can mark a new era in economic cooperation between developing and developed nations.  On a range of issues, such as agricultural liberalization and reduction of tariffs on non-agricultural goods, we’ve shown how our interests can converge with the developing world.”  The United States played a critical role in launching the Doha round, in making ambitious proposals to advance the negotiations, and in offering compromises to promote progress.  This high level of involvement is based on the belief that unleashing economic activity through the multilateral removal of trade barriers is a vital interest we share with all WTO Members.  The Fifth Ministerial Conference was a missed opportunity to move this agenda forward, and the United States stands by the ambitious proposals and other submissions we have tabled thus far in the Round.  (See Annex I.)

(ii)               Implementation of Existing Agreements

27.               Since entry into force of the Uruguay Round Agreements in 1995, a central theme of U.S. policy has been to ensure the effective and timely implementation of our WTO commitments.  We believe it is not only important for American trade interests, but for the WTO system as a whole to ensure all Members meet their commitments.  The various manifestations of this policy range from constructive participation in the deliberations of WTO committees to the active use of the dispute settlement mechanism.  U.S. trade policy seeks to support and advance the rule of law.  The United States continues to be among the most active participants in the WTO dispute settlement process, ensuring the enforcement of trade agreements and U.S. rights in the trading system.  With respect to dispute settlement, we have accepted the need to implement the rulings of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body in cases to which we are a party;  and where legislation has been required, we have worked with Congress to secure the necessary legislation and will continue to do so.

28.               For example, we have invoked authority under U.S. law to make determinations in response to DSB recommendations and rulings involving anti-dumping and safeguard investigations.  Congress has introduced legislation in response to DSB recommendations and rulings concerning, for example, the 1916 Act, the FSC/ETI legislation, the Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act, and section 211.  We have also agreed to the first arbitration proceeding under Article 25 of the DSU in order to help resolve the dispute concerning section 110 of the U.S. copyright law and Congress passed legislation necessary to facilitate reaching a resolution.

(iii)             Steel Trade Policy Initiative

29.               In 2002, the Administration continued to implement the President’s comprehensive strategy to respond to the challenges facing the United States steel industry.  This strategy, announced on June 5, 2001, is designed to restore market forces to world steel markets and to eliminate practices that harm the U.S. steel industry and its workers.

30.               The Administration’s initiative contains three elements.  First, the President directed the United States Trade Representative to request the initiation of an investigation of injury to the steel industry by the International Trade Commission under Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974.  Second, the President directed the United States Trade Representative, in cooperation with the Secretaries of Commerce and Treasury, to initiate negotiations with our trading partners to eliminate inefficient excess capacity in the steel industry worldwide.  Finally, the President directed the United States Trade Representative, together with the Secretaries of Commerce and Treasury, to initiate negotiations on the rules that will govern steel trade in the future, so as to eliminate the underlying market-distorting subsidies that led to current conditions.

31.               The President, in March 2002, imposed temporary safeguard measures after a comprehensive investigation by the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC), which found that imports of certain steel products were a substantial cause of serious injury to domestic steel industries.  These safeguards took the form of tariffs, ranging from 8 to 30 percent on ten steel products, and a tariff-rate quota (TRQ) on steel slab.  In order to minimize the impact of these tariffs on U.S. consumers, more than 1,000 niche steel products were excluded from the relief.  In addition, exports from our free trade partners and most exports from developing countries were excluded.

32.               After the safeguards were implemented, several WTO Members requested consultations under the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding.  When consultations failed to resolve the dispute, a panel was established to consider the complaints.  The WTO panel issued a report in July 2003 finding that the United States did not establish a sufficient basis for imposing the safeguard measures.  The United States appealed the panel report, and the Appellate Body report was released on November 10, 2003.  The WTO Appellate Body upheld the Panel’s ultimate conclusion that each of the ten U.S. safeguard measures was inconsistent with WTO rules.

33.               On September 19, 2003, the ITC issued its midterm report regarding the steel safeguard measures.  The ITC midterm report documented a number of changes that have occurred in domestic and global steel markets.  The ITC reported that “since the imposition of the safeguard measures, the industries producing steel products [subject to the safeguard] have undergone major restructuring and consolidation.”  The ITC report also indicated that steel producers and workers “negotiated groundbreaking collective bargaining agreements since the imposition of the safeguard measures.”

34.               On December 4, 2003, President Bush signed a proclamation terminating the steel tariffs and the TRQ.  The proclamation stated: “the U.S. steel industry wisely used the 21 months of breathing space we provided to consolidate and restructure.  The industry made progress increasing productivity, lowering production costs, and making America more competitive with foreign steel producers.”  As indicated in the proclamation, the President concluded that the safeguard measures have achieved their purpose, and as a result of changed economic circumstances, maintaining the measures was no longer warranted.  In his proclamation, the President indicated that the Administration would continue its steel import licensing and monitoring program, which was established concurrently with the safeguards so it can respond to future import surges that could unfairly damage the industry.

35.               Significant progress was made in implementing the other elements of the Administration’s steel strategy.  In December 2002, the world's major steel-producing countries began negotiations in the OECD to eliminate market-distorting government practices in steel trade, focusing first on the substantial reduction and elimination of market-distorting steel subsidies. The agreement by all of the world's major steel producers to begin these negotiations was a historic achievement in a sector of the world economy that has defied previous reform efforts. Participants also reached consensus on a work schedule that aims to produce an advanced working text by the spring of 2004.  The participants in the OECD discussions of excess inefficient steel capacity have forecasted significant closure of such capacity, and have commenced a robust peer review process in which governments report information and answer questions about capacity developments within their territories.  Projections by participants in this process show that excess inefficient capacity will fall by 140 million metric tons through 2005.  The ongoing work on steel at the OECD represents the most sustained and comprehensive commitment of any Administration – and any country – to address the root causes of ongoing market distortions in the world steel market.

(2)               Regional Initiatives

36.               The United States pursues an active agenda of ambitious trade liberalization on the multilateral, regional and bilateral levels.  Regional and bilateral agreements that are fully consistent with WTO rules and objectives can both support and expand trade liberalization in the multilateral trading system.  With this in mind, and in order to capture and multiply the benefits of an expanding global trading system, the United States is actively embarked on an agenda of greater commercial interaction in emerging markets.

37.               The United States is pursuing regional trade initiatives in the Western Hemisphere, the Middle East and Africa, such as the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), the Central American Free Trade Area (CAFTA), the Middle East Free Trade Area (MEFTA), and U.S–Southern Africa Customs Union (SACU).  Regional work also includes monitoring compliance with, and improving functioning of, current agreements and programs, including the North America Free Trade Area (NAFTA), the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA), and the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act (ATPDEA).  At the same time, we seek to cultivate our economic ties and cooperation with Europe through the Transatlantic Economic Partnership Initiative.

38.               Without exception, the regional initiatives in which the United States is involved look to the WTO as a solid foundation upon which to build.  The WTO recognizes the desirability of increasing freedom of trade by the development, through voluntary agreements, of closer integration between the economies of the countries party to such agreements, as long as the agreements do not result in increasing the external barriers of the parties.  Such agreements challenge the multilateral system to keep pace with the interests and needs of Members, and contribute to the WTO system by introducing innovation and strengthened disciplines.  These agreements can become models for future multilateral liberalization in new areas, such as agriculture, services, investment, and environmental and labor standards.  The following regional initiatives are each examples of this potential.

(i)                 North American Free Trade Area

39.               In January 1994, the United States began to implement the NAFTA, the world's largest free trade area.  Built on the U.S.‑Canada Free Trade Agreement (CFTA) of 1989, NAFTA includes over 427 million people producing more than $11 trillion worth of goods and services.  NAFTA increases opportunities for all three partners, Mexico, Canada, and the United States, to expand trade and enhance growth.  Countries outside the free‑trade area also benefit from stronger growth in North America, as the Agreement acts to enhance the size of the NAFTA market and purchasing power of NAFTA countries.  Since the Agreement’s entry into force, the United States has worked to ensure that its provisions are implemented swiftly;  indeed, the Parties have implemented four rounds of accelerated tariff reductions.  The three governments also implemented agreements on labor and environmental cooperation along with the NAFTA.

40.               Since January 1, 1994, when the NAFTA entered into force, three-way trade amongst the NAFTA countries has reached over $621 billion, more than double the pre-NAFTA level. Foreign direct investment by other NAFTA partners in the NAFTA countries more than doubled to reach $299.2 billion in 2000.  Canada is the largest trading partner of the United States and Mexico became its second largest trading partner in 1999.  U.S. exports to these two North American markets account for approximately 37 percent of total U.S. global exports.

41.               On January 1, 2003, most of the remaining tariffs between the Parties were eliminated.  Except for a handful of items, trade in North America is duty- and quota-free.  At the October 2003 meeting of the NAFTA Free Trade Commission (FTC), the body responsible for the implementation of the Agreement, the trade ministers from the NAFTA Parties agreed to launch an initiative to study the Parties’ most-favoured-nation tariffs, in order to determine whether harmonizing these tariffs could further promote trade by reducing export-related transaction costs.  The FTC also agreed to pursue further liberalization of the NAFTA rules of origin and it issued two statements aimed at improving the transparency and efficiency of investor-state arbitration under the investment chapter of NAFTA (Chapter 11).

(ii)               Free Trade Area of the Americas Negotiations

42.               At the first Summit of the Americas, which was held in Miami in 1994, the leaders of the United States and the other 33 democratically elected governments in the Western Hemisphere agreed to create the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA).  The FTAA will be the largest free trade area in the world, covering North America, South America, and the Caribbean Basin, and encompassing nearly 800 million people.  When they met again for the third Summit of the Americas in Quebec City in 2001, the leaders reaffirmed their commitment to the FTAA process and provided momentum to the negotiations by agreeing to conclude FTAA negotiations no later than January 2005 and to seek the Agreement's entry into force as soon as possible thereafter, but in any case no later than December 2005.

43.               At the Eighth FTAA Ministerial meeting which was held on November 20, 2003 in Miami, Florida, the FTAA ministers responsible for trade met under the leadership of the United States and Brazil, as current FTAA co-chairs.  The ministers reaffirmed their commitment to the FTAA’s comprehensive agenda and the negotiation of a common and balanced set of rights and obligations applicable to all in nine negotiating disciplines (agricultural and non-agricultural goods, services, investment, government procurement, intellectual property, competition policy, subsidies, anti-dumping and countervailing duties, and dispute settlement.)  They also reaffirmed their commitment to the ultimate goal of establishing an area of free trade and regional integration and to completing negotiations by January 2005.  In support of this timetable, the ministers have directed that negotiations on market access in the areas of agricultural and non-agricultural goods, services, investment and government procurement be completed by September 30, 2004.

44.               Ministers also recognized that in the FTAA process, countries might assume higher-level commitments above and beyond the core set of obligations.  In furtherance of their commitment to ensure that even the smallest economies in the FTAA are able to participate in and benefit from the negotiation of the FTAA, the Ministers also made decisions intended to ensure that measures to account for differences in size of economies and levels of development are included in the agreement, and that the Hemispheric Cooperation Program is fully implemented.  The Ministers continued the tradition of transparency in the FTAA negotiations by making public the third draft of the text of the agreement.  They again met with representatives from civil society and business to receive and consider their views on the FTAA.  In addition, they heard from Ministers of Labor from Brazil, Canada and Mexico on the results of work of the Inter-American Conference of Ministers of Labor examining, inter alia, questions of globalization related to employment and labor.

45.               The FTAA will support and enhance our commitment to the multilateral system.  In November 2003, the trade ministers from throughout the hemisphere reiterated their pledge that the FTAA will be a balanced, comprehensive agreement that is consistent with the rules and disciplines of the WTO, and that will coexist with existing bilateral and sub-regional agreements, to the extent that rights and obligations under these agreements are not covered by or go beyond the rights and obligations of the FTAA. The increase in economic growth and improved access to new ideas resulting from liberalized trade brought about by the FTAA will also reinforce democratic principles in the region.

(iii)             Central American Free Trade Negotiations

46.               The United States and Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua launched negotiations in January 2003 to create the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA). Eight rounds of negotiations have been held during 2003 in both Central America and the United States.  The ninth and final round is scheduled for December 2003.  The United States also expects to broaden CAFTA disciplines next year to include the Dominican Republic. The first formal negotiating round between the U.S. and the Dominican Republic will be held in January 2004 in the Dominican Republic.

47.               The United States and the five Central American countries share almost $25 billion in total two-way trade in goods.  U.S. goods exports to Central America are on track to reach $11.5 billion in 2003, better than a 42 percent increase since 1996.  That total is about the same as U.S. exports to Russia, India and Indonesia combined.  The United States is expected to import $13 billion worth of goods from Central America in 2003.

48.               The United States is pursuing the CAFTA agreement to help increase trade, overcome poverty, foster development, and strengthen democracy.  Establishing free trade between the United States and Central America is an important part of President Bush’s vision for a closer, more unified and more prosperous hemisphere.  CAFTA will also advance free trade in the hemisphere by further expanding a growing core of pro-free trade countries that includes our FTA partners Canada, Chile and Mexico.

(iv)             U.S. - Southern Africa Customs Union Free Trade Agreement

49.               On November 4, 2002, U.S. Trade Representative Robert B. Zoellick notified Congress of President Bush’s decision to negotiate a free trade agreement (FTA) with the five member countries of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU).  These nations—Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland—comprise the largest U.S. export market in sub-Saharan Africa, with $2.5 billion in U.S. exports in 2002.  SACU and the United States held successful rounds of FTA negotiations in June, August, and October 2003.

50.               This FTA— the first ever between the United States and sub-Saharan African countries — offers an opportunity to craft a groundbreaking agreement that will serve as a model for similar efforts in the developing world.  The SACU countries are strong economic reformers and leading AGOA beneficiaries.  They have seen the positive role that trade can play in promoting economic growth and development and, through the FTA negotiations, are taking an important step toward deeper economic engagement with the United States.  Through an FTA with SACU, U.S. businesses will gain preferential access to their largest export market in sub-Saharan Africa.  By building on the success of AGOA, the SACU countries would secure the kind of guaranteed access to the American market that supports long-term investment and economic prosperity.  The FTA would also reinforce ongoing regional economic reforms and lower the perceived risk of doing business in southern Africa.

(v)               Asia – Pacific Economic Cooperation

51.               The United States has continued its active involvement in the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Forum.  Founded in 1989, APEC is a unique combination of the world's largest established markets and emerging markets.  The organization now counts 21 member economies on both sides of the Pacific, and accounts for about half of world trade and a growing proportion of world output.  The United States considers APEC an important vehicle for building a regional economic structure to ensure prosperity and stability over the long term.  In the past few years, APEC has made concrete progress toward its objectives of advancing economic cooperation and trade and investment liberalization and facilitation, and toward the long-term goal of “free and open trade and investment” in the region.

52.               APEC leaders met in Bogor, Indonesia, in 1994 and agreed to dismantle, over the next 25 years, barriers that impede trade and investment among their economies.  In the 2001-2003 period, important activity has taken place at all levels of APEC, from the Leaders and Ministerial Agreements to the work of Senior Officials and the Committee on Trade and Investment, to give effect to APEC’s vision of free and open regional trade and investment.  APEC’s Committee on Trade and Investment and its sub-fora have developed specific work programs in sixteen substantive issue areas: tariffs, non-tariff measures, services, investment, government procurement, standards and conformance, customs, competition policy, deregulation, intellectual property rights, dispute mediation, mobility of business people, rules of origin, information gathering/analysis, and implementation of WTO obligations (including rules of origin), and Strengthening Economic Legal Infrastructure.

53.               In 2001 APEC Leaders gathered in Shanghai and agreed to an ambitious agenda to increase transparency in economic governance, improve regional trade facilitation, and advance trade in the digital economy.  At the 2002 and 2003 meetings in Los Cabos and Bangkok, respectively, Leaders endorsed frameworks for implementing the agreements made in each of these areas.  Additionally, APEC members began a more meaningful process for reviewing the openness of each other’s trade and investment regimes.  Throughout this period APEC Leaders and Ministers have maintained their commitment to advancing negotiations under the WTO’s Doha Development Agenda (DDA).  In Bangkok, Leaders and Ministers called on all WTO members to quickly re-energize the DDA negotiation process.  They provided leadership in calling for WTO members to build off the Cancun text in the resumption of DDA negotiations.  Lastly, they asserted that a successful outcome to the negotiations requires political flexibility and will, and is essential for strengthening the global trading system and promoting global economic development and well being.

(vi)             Middle East Free Trade Area

54.               The United States Middle East Free Trade Area initiative (MEFTA) seeks to promote trade expansion and economic reforms in North Africa and the Middle East leading to a Middle East Free Trade Area within a decade.  To re-ignite economic growth and expand opportunity in the Middle East, the U.S. will build on the free trade agreements (FTAs) with Israel, Jordan and the soon to be concluded agreement with Morocco, and take a series of graduated steps with countries in the region that will culminate in the MEFTA.  These steps include supporting reforming countries with WTO applications for accession, enhancing access to the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) program for eligible countries, negotiating Trade and Investment Framework Agreements, negotiating Bilateral Investment Treaties, negotiating comprehensive Free Trade Agreements, melding sub-regional FTAs into MEFTA, and helping with technical assistance.

(vii)           U.S.-Andean Free Trade Negotiations

55.               On November 18, 2003, U.S. Trade Representative Robert B. Zoellick formally notified Congress, on behalf of President Bush, of the Administration's intent to initiate negotiations for a free trade agreement with Colombia, Peru, Ecuador, and Bolivia. The Administration plans to structure the negotiations to begin in the second quarter of 2004, initially with Colombia and Peru. The United States is prepared to work intensively with Ecuador and Bolivia in order to include them in the agreement as well. As a destination for U.S. exports, the Andeans collectively represented a market of $7 billion in 2002, while the U.S. imported $9.8 billion from the region. The stock of U.S. foreign direct investment in the four countries was $4.5 billion in 2002.

(viii)         Trans-Atlantic Economic Partnership

56.               The United States-European Union relationship, one of the most durable in the world, is further strengthened by the New Transatlantic Agenda (NTA), an initiative which seeks to deepen transatlantic relations by initiating specific, joint U.S.-EU actions to address global economic, political, humanitarian and environmental challenges more effectively.  This is a key component of U.S. efforts to meet the challenges posed by the post-Cold War reality, including the need to build a strong transatlantic community of democratic, free market economies.  The 1995 NTA Action Plan included a commitment on the part of the United States and the EU to expand bilateral trade through an initiative called the New Transatlantic Marketplace (encompassing a number of specific joint cooperative steps in the economic policy area to which both sides committed).

57.               The Transatlantic Economic Partnership (TEP) initiative, which seeks to deepen and systematize the cooperation in trade, was launched at the May 1998 U.S.-EU Summit as a further evolution of the NTA’s New Transatlantic Marketplace initiative. Under the TEP, the two sides identified seven broad areas in which they committed to work together to increase trade, avoid disputes, address disagreements, remove barriers and achieve mutual interests.  These areas covered: technical standards, agriculture, intellectual property, government procurement, services, electronic commerce, environment, and labor.  In addition, the United States and EU agreed to put an emphasis throughout the initiative on shared values, i.e. they agreed to more fully involve citizens and civil society on both sides of the Atlantic in trade policy so as to strengthen the consensus for open trade.  Cooperation under the TEP is envisioned to occur on bilateral matters as well as in the context of multilateral activities such as in the WTO.  The TEP Action Plan lays out specific goals under each of the above categories that the two sides hope to achieve as soon as possible.

58.               In the 1999-2001 period the US and EU agreed to try to utilize the TEP mechanisms also to carry out part of a joint effort to identify – and hopefully defuse – potential trade problems at an early stage. The two sides worked to develop common guidelines for regulatory cooperation and transparency – an area increasingly seen by the business community as important to the further deepening of transatlantic commercial ties.

59.               At the June 24, 2001 U.S.-EU Summit in Göteborg, Sweden, President Bush and EU Leaders agreed to strengthen their transatlantic bond.  At the following bilateral Summit in May 2002, the two sides unveiled the Positive Economic Agenda (PEA) initiative, which identified several priority areas for joint cooperation, including further work on the TEP-initiated guidelines for regulatory cooperation and transparency, informal dialogue on financial market issues, and resolution of certain agricultural trade problems.  Work on these issues has continued through 2003, leading to a number of projects launched under the regulatory cooperation guidelines and the completion of a bilateral mutual recognition agreement (MRA) covering marine safety.  Further progress (including signature of the marine safety MRA) on these and additional issues as appropriate is envisaged for 2004.

60.               The United States and the EU have supplemented the TEP and NTA initiatives through the establishment of a series of private dialogues between European and American businesses, labor organizations and consumer groups.  The first of these to be established, the Transatlantic Business Dialogue (TABD), is a forum in which top American and European business leaders can meet to discuss ways to reduce barriers to United States-European trade and investment.  Additional dialogues – the Transatlantic Labor Dialogue (TALD), the Transatlantic Consumer Dialogue (TACD), and the Transatlantic Legislative Dialogue (TLD) – start from a similar premise, i.e., that corresponding organizations on both sides of the Atlantic should share views and, where possible, present joint recommendations to the United States and the EU on how to improve transatlantic relations and elevate the debate among countries in multilateral fora.  The United States is committed to full participation of civil society in the trade policy process and intends to cooperate closely with all the dialogue groups as it works to implement the TEP initiative.

(ix)             African Growth and Opportunity Act

61.               The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), enacted in May 2001 as part of the Trade and Development Act of 2000, is the centerpiece of U.S. trade policy for sub-Saharan Africa.  AGOA provides a number of key economic benefits and incentives to promote economic reform and trade expansion in sub-Saharan Africa.  The Act also institutionalizes a process for strengthening U.S. trade relations with sub-Saharan African countries by establishing an annual ministerial-level forum with AGOA-eligible countries.

62.               AGOA offers beneficiary sub-Saharan African countries duty‑free access to the U.S. market for essentially all products.  It extended the existing Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) program for beneficiary countries through September 30, 2008 and added 1,835 products to the 4,650 products already eligible for duty-free treatment under GSP.  It eliminated the GSP competitive-need limitation for beneficiary sub‑Saharan African countries, lifted all existing quotas on apparel products from eligible countries that are determined to have effective measures in place to prevent illegal transhipment, and allows less developed country beneficiary countries to use regional or third-party fabric in apparel imported into the United States under the program.  For the fiscal year beginning October 1, 2003, AGOA apparel imports are subject to a cap of 4.7931 percent of total U.S. apparel imports.  This cap will increase by roughly a half a percent each year through the end of AGOA’s authorization in September 2008.  Apparel imported under the special, third-country fabric provision is subject to a cap of 2.3571 percent of total U.S. apparel imports.  The third-country fabric provision is set to expire on September 30, 2004, though legislation has been introduced in the U.S. Congress that would extend the provision beyond this date.

63.               AGOA requires the President to determine annually whether sub-Saharan African countries are, or remain, eligible for benefits based on their progress in meeting criteria set out in the Act.  These criteria include establishment of a market‑based economy and the rule of law, the elimination of barriers to U.S. trade and investment, implementation of economic policies to reduce poverty, the protection of internationally recognized worker rights, and establishment of a system to combat corruption.  Additionally, countries cannot engage in: 1) violations of internationally‑recognized human rights, 2) support for acts of international terrorism, or 3) activities that undermine U.S. national security or foreign policy interests.  An interagency AGOA Implementation Subcommittee, chaired by USTR, conducts the annual eligibility review, drawing on information from the public, NGOs, the private sector, and the prospective beneficiary governments.  Following the last eligibility review in December 2002, and based on the recommendation of the U.S. Trade Representative, the President determined that 38 countries met the Act’s requirements for eligibility.  Of these, 22 had instituted acceptable customs measures to prevent illegal trans-shipment and, accordingly, had been certified for AGOA’s textile and apparel benefits.[2]

64.               The Trade Act of 2002 included several enhancements to AGOA, including:  1) a doubling of the annual quantitative limit on apparel produced in the region from regional fabric;  2) the extension of lesser developed country benefits to Botswana and Namibia, allowing producers there to use third-country fabric in qualifying apparel;  3) the inclusion of knit-to-shape apparel in the list of goods eligible for quota-and duty-free treatment under AGOA;  and 4) correction of a technical definition for the use of fine merino wool.

65.               In the three years since its passage, AGOA has had a significant impact on growth and economic development in several beneficiary countries.  AGOA-related trade and investment has created over 190,000 African jobs and over $340 million in investments.  AGOA imports totaled $9 billion in 2002 and represented almost half of total U.S. imports from sub-Saharan Africa.  Over 92 percent of U.S. imports from AGOA-eligible countries now enter the United States duty-free, under AGOA, GSP, or zero-duty MFN rates.  While most U.S. imports from the region continue to be in the energy sector, AGOA has begun to diversify U.S.-African trade.  For example, in 2002 non-fuel AGOA imports totaled $2.2 billion, with apparel imports totaling $803 million, roughly twice the amount in 2001.  AGOA transportation equipment imports were up 81 percent, to $545 million, and AGOA agricultural imports increased 38 percent, to $212 million.  Trade in these key areas continued to rise in 2003.  In the first nine months of 2003, AGOA apparel imports increased 42 percent over the same period in 2002;  transportation equipment imports increased 24 percent, and agricultural imports were up 17 percent during the same period.

(x)               The Caribbean Basin Initiative

66.               The trade programs known collectively as the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) remain an important part of U.S. economic relations with its neighbors in Central America and the Caribbean.  Initially launched in 1983 through the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA), the CBI provides 24 beneficiary countries with duty-free access to the United States market for most goods.  In 1990, the CBERA was amended to extend further market access opportunities to the United States and was made permanent.

67.               In May 2000, the United States enacted a further expansion of the CBI through the Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act (CBTPA).  The CBTPA enhanced CBERA benefits by authorizing preferential tariff treatment for certain qualifying apparel articles.  The CBTPA also extended NAFTA-equivalent duty treatment to a number of products previously excluded from the CBERA, including certain tuna, petroleum products, certain footwear, and some watches and watch parts.  The Trade Act of 2002, passed on August 6, 2002, further amended the CBERA to expand the type and quantity of textile and apparel articles eligible for the preferential tariff treatment accorded to designated beneficiary CBTPA countries.  Among other benefits, the Trade Act of 2002 expands the duty-free treatment available for clothing made in beneficiary countries from U.S. and regional inputs, and increases the quantity of clothing made from regional inputs that regional producers can ship duty-free to the United States annually.

68.               U.S. imports (preferential and non-preferential imports combined) from CBERA countries remained steady during 2002.  However, imports in the preferential portion—those under CBERA including CBTPA—rose sharply, reflecting the expansion of CBERA benefits to include certain types of apparel.  Total U.S. imports from CBERA beneficiary countries amounted to $21.3 billion in 2002.  Of this amount, $10 billion, or 47 percent, entered under CBERA (including CBTPA) preferences.

69.               In 2002, the Dominican Republic continued to lead all countries in taking advantage of CBERA, as it has done in virtually every year since the program became effective, accounting for almost 27 percent of U.S. imports under the CBERA provisions.  Honduras continued to be the second largest user with 20 percent of the share, the same as 2001.  Costa Rica, El Salvador, Trinidad and Tobago, and Guatemala round out the leading users of the program, accounting for a combined 43 percent of the share

70.               The CBERA and CBTPA impose conditions that countries must meet to be designated and to maintain beneficiary status.  These criteria include protection of intellectual property rights, internationally recognized worker rights, implementation of WTO obligations, and transparency in government procurement practices.

(xi)             Andean Trade Preferences

71.               President Bush signed the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act (ATPDEA) into law on August 6, 2002. The signing renewed and expanded the product coverage of the Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA), which had expired on December 4, 2001. The ATPA was originally enacted in 1991 in order to provide incentives to Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru to diversify their economies away from narcotics production. It has strengthened the legitimate economies in these Andean countries and created viable alternatives to the profitable drug trade.  The original ATPA enacted in 1991 provided beneficiary countries duty-free treatment for most of their exports to the United States, except for textiles, apparel, footwear, leather, tuna in airtight containers, and certain other items.

72.               The ATPDEA restored all of the benefits of the original ATPA program, providing for retroactive reimbursement of duties paid during the period since the program’s lapse in December 2001.  It also expanded the list of items eligible for duty-free treatment to about 700 more products.  The most significant expansion of benefits in the ATPA as amended by the ATPDEA is in the apparel sector. Other new products benefiting from the program includes: tuna in pouches, leather products, footwear, petroleum and petroleum products, and watches and watch parts.  In 2001 U.S. imports from the Andean region under the provisions of ATPA were about $1.7 billion, though in 2002 they dropped to $1 billion due to the lapse in the program.  However, the 2003 year-to-date (January to August) imports under the program have already reached $3.7 billion.

(3)               Bilateral Initiatives

(i)                 U.S. - Chile Free Trade Agreement

73.               In December 2002 the United States and Chile concluded negotiation of a comprehensive bilateral free trade agreement.  The Parties signed the agreement on June 6, 2003 and it has been approved by the legislatures of both Parties.  It will go into effect on January 1, 2004.  The agreement eliminates tariffs and quotas covering all trade between the two countries at the end of a twelve-year transition period, with 85 percent of goods traded receiving duty-free treatment in the first year.  In addition to trade in goods, the U.S. – Chile FTA includes services, investment, competition policy, intellectual property, electronic commerce, telecommunications, financial services, government procurement, labor, environment, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, technical barriers to trade, customs administration, dispute settlement and rules of origin.  The agreement is expected to have significant commercial benefits for both countries.  It will expand trade and investment between the United States and Chile, which was the United States 36th largest trading partner in goods in 2002 (with $2.6 billion in exports and $3.8 billion in imports).

(ii)               U.S. - Singapore Free Trade Agreement

74.               The U.S.-Singapore Free Trade Agreement was signed in Washington on May 6, 2003.  President Bush signed the legislation to implement the United States-Singapore Free Trade Agreement (FTA) on September 3, 2003.  The United States and Singapore expect to complete ratification procedures in December 2003 and the Agreement is expected to enter-into-force on January 1, 2004.  This FTA is comprehensive and covers aspects of trade in goods, services, investment, government procurement, protection of intellectual property, competition policy and the relationship between trade and labor and environment.  This Agreement eliminates duties and commercial barriers to bilateral trade in goods and services.

(iii)             U.S. – Jordan Free Trade Agreement

75.               The U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement, signed in October 2000, entered into force in December 2001.  The Agreement eliminates virtually all tariffs on industrial goods and agricultural products, as well as commercial barriers to bilateral trade in goods and services originating in the United States and Jordan.  Provisions address intellectual property rights protection, balance of payments, rules of origin, safeguards, labor, environment, electronic commerce, and procedural matters such as consultations and dispute settlement.  The agreement builds on other U.S. initiatives in the region designed to encourage economic development, integration, and peace.  Under the Agreement, U.S. goods exports to Jordan in 2002 were $404 million, up 19 percent ($65 million) from 2001.  U.S. goods imports from Jordan totaled $412 million in 2002, an 80 percent increase ($183 million) from 2001.

(iv)             U.S. – Israel Free Trade Agreement

76.               The United States-Israel Free Trade Area Agreement (FTA), signed in 1985, provided for phased tariff reductions culminating in the complete elimination of duties on all trade by 1995.  With respect to the United States, it is estimated that 97.8% of chapter 1 through 97 tariff lines are currently either MFN Free or U.S.-Israel FTA duty-free.  Since its signing, the FTA has been an essential catalyst in facilitating the growth in trade and investment between the two countries.  During 2002 two-way trade in goods totaled $19.5 billion, making Israel the United States’ 21^st largest goods trading partner.  Trade in services with Israel (exports and imports) account for 18% of the level of goods trade with Israel.  U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI) in Israel (stock) was $4.1 billion in 2001, a 21.7 percent increase from 2000.  Israel FDI in the United States (stock) was $2.9 billion in 2001, up 6.9% from 2000.

77.               The U.S.-Israel FTA applies to trade in all goods between the two countries. However, the United States and Israel held differing interpretations as to the meaning of certain rights and obligations related to agricultural goods under the agreement.  In 1996, in the interest of achieving practical improvements in agricultural trade between the two countries and without prejudice to the parties’ rights and obligations under the FTA, the United States and Israel signed an adjunct to the FTA, the U.S.-Israel Agreement on Trade in Agricultural Products.  Since its expiration in 2001, the parties have extended the benefits provided under Agriculture Agreement as they negotiated a successor arrangement.  The new Agriculture Agreement, which will go into effect in 2004, will provide duty-free treatment for over 90 percent of bilateral agricultural trade.

(v)               U.S. - Australia Free Trade Negotiations

78.               In November 2002, the Administration notified the Congress of the President’s intent to launch negotiations for a comprehensive bilateral free trade agreement with Australia.  Five rounds of negotiations have been held.  Trade between the United States and Australia has grown significantly in the past decade, totaling nearly $20 billion in 2002, and the agreement is expected further boost trade in both goods and services and encourage additional foreign investment between the two countries.

(vi)             U.S. - Morocco Free Trade Negotiations

79.               President Bush and King Mohammed VI announced in April 2002 their intention to launch negotiations on a FTA between the U.S. and Morocco.  Negotiations commenced in January 2003 and have continued through the year.  The FTA will enhance the trade and investment relationship between the two countries and contribute towards the President's trade agenda for the region to build a Middle East Free Trade Area (MEFTA). The agreement would eliminate tariffs and other barriers to trade in goods, agriculture, services, and investment between the U.S. and Morocco.

(vii)           U.S. – Thailand Free Trade Negotiations

80.               Following the APEC Leader’s meeting in Bangkok in October 2003, President Bush announced that the United States intends take the steps required to initiate negotiations on a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with Thailand.  The announcement is recognition of the progress both countries have made in deepening trade relations during the past year.  Thailand is prepared to negotiate an agreement that contains the comprehensive coverage and high standards that the United States seeks.

(viii)         U.S. – Panama Free Trade Agreement

81.               On November 18, 2003, U.S. Trade Representative Robert Zoellick formally notified Congress, on behalf of President Bush, of the Administration’s intent to initiate negotiations for a free trade agreement with the Republic of Panama.  The launch of negotiations is expected during the second quarter of 2004.  In 2002, bilateral trade between the United States and Panama totaled $1.7 billion.  U.S. exports accounted for $1.4 billion of that amount.  Nearly half of Panama’s total imports come from the United States, and the United States holds approximately $25 billion in foreign direct investment in Panama.  Such investments range from finance, to maritime, to energy.

(ix)             U.S. – Bahrain Free Trade Agreement

82.               On August 4, 2003, USTR notified Congress of the President’s intent to negotiate a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with Bahrain.  This is a first step in implementing the President Bush’s initiative for advancing economic reforms in the Middle East and pursuing the goal of a Middle East Free Trade Area (MEFTA) by 2013. A U.S.-Bahrain FTA could serve as a regional anchor for the Gulf facilitating greater economic integration and reforms, and leading toward the eventual goal of a Middle East Free Trade Area.  The successful conclusion of a comprehensive U.S.-Bahrain FTA would enhance commercial relations with an economic leader in the Gulf and set the stage for improving trade relations and expanding openness with other countries in the region, increasing prosperity, opportunity, and hope.  The two countries expect to start formal negotiations in January 2004.

(4)               Trade-Related Capacity Building Initiatives

83.               The United States is the largest single-country donor of trade-related technical assistance in the world, reflecting its commitment to helping developing countries participate fully in the global trading system.  The President’s Trade Policy Agenda for 2003 states that the “United States is committed to expanding the circle of nations that benefit from global trade...[and] to help[ing] developing economies build the capacity to take part in trade negotiations, implement the rules, and seize opportunities.”

84.               U.S. trade capacity building efforts stem from the basic belief that trade and globalization is critical to the growth of developed and developing countries.  By having increased capacity to take part in trade negotiations, implement the rules, and seize opportunities, developing countries can achieve win-win results for themselves and their trading partners.

85.               As the largest single-country donor, the United States devotes substantial resources to TCB activities through USAID and a dozen or so other agencies, totaling more than $2.5 billion in funding (FY2000 through FY2003).  The USG provided $752 million in TCB activities in FY2003, up 18 percent from FY2002. This funding is allocated as follows:

$174 million in the Middle East and North Africa;

$150 million in Latin America and the Caribbean;

$133 million in sub-Saharan Africa;

$92 million in Asia;

$84 million in the former Soviet Republics;

$65 million in Central and Eastern Europe;  and

$53 million for non-targeted global projects.

86.               The United States is also the largest single-country contributor to the World Bank and other multilateral development banks, which provide an increasingly broad range of TCB assistance to the Doha Development Agenda.

87.               In Cancun, the United States pledged an additional $1.2 million for trade-related technical assistance (TRTA) to the World Trade Organization (WTO).  This contribution augments $1 million given earlier in 2003, bringing total U.S. support for WTO TRTA to more than $3 million since the launch of Doha negotiations in November 2001.  This money is in direct support of programs like the annual WTO Technical Assistance Plan.

88.               The United States is also a strong supporter of the Integrated Framework (IF).  For example, the United States has contributed funds for the past three years to the Integrated Framework Trust Fund in order to finance the Diagnostic Trade Integration Studies (DTIS).  This includes $200,000 of the Cancun pledge being specifically reserved for the Trust Fund.  USAID also set aside $3 million in FY02 to support follow-up projects managed by USAID missions. Those funds have been allocated to USAID’s missions in Cambodia, Mozambique, and Senegal.

89.               The United States also supports countries that are negotiating accession to the WTO.  For example, USAID will provide WTO accession and implementation services for up to three countries, including a current project in Cape Verde.  This project is planned for up to $4 million dollars over three years, subject to Congressional appropriations.

90.               The WTO and the Integrated Framework are priorities of the U.S. TCB effort, which includes other elements as well.  The United States recognizes the need to build the capacity of developing countries with which it is negotiating free trade agreements, particularly in the areas of environment and labor.  To complement the on-going CAFTA, FTAA and SACU free trade negotiations, separate cooperative groups on trade capacity building were established with the purpose of defining and identifying priority needs.  The United States also seeks to give eligible countries the capacity to take advantage of preference programs like the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA).  For example, U.S. technical assistance linked to AGOA assists eligible countries to identify markets, establish linkages with American businesses, and meet U.S. food safety and other standards.

91.               Moving forward, the United States aims to continue helping the developing world incorporate trade into their development assistance strategies.  This includes supporting multilateral institutions and other donors to promote initiatives such as the FTAA’s Hemispheric Cooperation Program, the WTO Technical Assistance Plan and the Integrated Framework.  As it concludes bilateral negotiations, the United States will assist its trading partners to implement their commitments and transition to free trade.  The United States will also actively work with nations with which it launches new negotiations to build their greater capacities to trade.  Finally, the United States will help qualifying countries to maximize the benefits of preference programs like AGOA.

(5)               Legislative Agenda

92.               President Bush’s legislative agenda for international trade demonstrates his continued commitment to opening global markets, which will lead to lower prices, more employment opportunities, and greater worldwide choices for consumers, farmers, manufacturers, service providers, and other industries.  The Bush administration will continue to work in close partnership with the Congress to maintain American leadership in trade.

93.               The Bush administration has initiated a strong effort to seek enhanced market access around the world and to strengthen trading relationships with developing country trade partners through bilateral and regional trading initiatives.  The President will seek congressional implementation upon completion of free trade agreements (FTAs) with Morocco, the CAFTA countries (Costa Rica, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua), the Dominican Republic and Australia.  The President will also seek congressional approval of an extension of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) to encourage and promote continued economic growth and reform in sub-Saharan Africa.

94.               Building on the enactment of the Trade Act of 2002, which gave the President Trade Promotion Authority (TPA), President Bush will continue to utilize this authority in a collaborative manner with the Congress in seeking additional market-opening opportunities bilaterally, regionally, and globally.  In 2003, the President signed, and the Congress implemented, FTAs with Singapore and Chile.  In 2004, the Bush administration will continue his close consultations with the Congress regarding negotiations on the Doha Development round of the WTO, and ongoing FTA negotiations, including those with Australia, the five countries of the South African Customs Union (SACU), Bahrain, the Dominican Republic, Thailand, the four countries benefiting from the Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA), and Panama;  the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA);  and the Middle East Free Trade Area (MEFTA).

95.               A priority of the President’s legislative trade agenda is to work with the Congress to comply with WTO rulings.  This important objective includes seeking concrete legislative progress regarding cases involving the foreign sales corporation/extra-territorial income (FSC/ETI) tax regime;  the Byrd rule;  the 1916 antidumping act;  section 211 of the 1999 omnibus appropriations act;  and hot-rolled steel, among others.

(6)               Labour Issues

96.               Participation in the global economy through international trade is a primary avenue for growth and development today.  International trade also increases opportunities for workers to expand their earnings and employment options.  The challenge for governments is to ensure that citizens benefit from globalization while minimizing the economic and social costs of adjustment.  It is now widely recognized that respect for and adherence to internationally recognized core labor standards is an important element in responding to this challenge.

97.               The labor-related overall U.S. trade negotiating objectives are threefold.  First, to promote respect for worker rights and rights of children consistent with the core labor standards of the International Labor Organization (ILO).  TPA defines core labor standards as:  (1) the right of association;  (2) the right to organize and bargain collectively;  (3) a prohibition on the use of forced or compulsory labor;  (4) a minimum age for the employment of children;  and (5) acceptable conditions of work with respect to minimum wages, hours of work, and occupational safety and health.  Secondly, to strive to ensure that parties to trade agreements do not weaken or reduce the protections of domestic labor laws as an encouragement for trade.  And finally, to promote the universal ratification and full compliance with ILO Convention 182—which the United States has ratified—concerning the elimination of the worst forms of child labor.

98.               The principal trade negotiating objectives in TPA include, most importantly for labor, the provision that a party to a trade agreement with the United States should not fail to effectively enforce its labor laws in a manner affecting trade.  TPA recognizes that the United States and its trading partners retain the sovereign right to establish domestic labor laws, and to exercise discretion with respect to regulatory and compliance matters, and to make resource allocation decisions with respect to labor law enforcement.  To strengthen the capacity of our trading partners to promote respect for core labor standards is an additional principal negotiating objective, as is to ensure that labor, health or safety policies and practices of our trading partners do not arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate against American exports or serve as disguised trade barriers.  A final principal negotiating objective is to seek commitments by parties to trade agreements to vigorously enforce their laws prohibiting the worst forms of child labor.

99.               In addition to seeking greater cooperation between the WTO and the ILO, other labor-related priorities in TPA include the establishment of consultative mechanisms among parties to trade agreements to strengthen their capacity to promote respect for core labor standards and compliance with ILO Convention 182.  The Department of Labor is charged with consulting with any country seeking a trade agreement with the United States concerning that country’s labor laws, and providing technical assistance if needed.  Finally, TPA mandates a series of labor-related reviews and reports to Congress in connection with the negotiation of new trade agreements.  These include an employment impact review of future trade agreements, the procedures for which are modelled after the Executive Order establishing environmental impact reviews of trade agreements.  A meaningful labor rights report, and a report describing the extent to which there are laws governing exploitative child labor, are also required for each of the countries with which we are negotiating.

100.            WTO ministers renewed their commitment to the observance of internationally recognized core labor standards in the 2001 Doha Ministerial Declaration.  Recognizing that there is a connection between labor standards and trade issues, we believe that the subject of implementation of core labor standards is relevant for TPRM reviews.  In reviews of other countries, the United States has raised questions about the application of core labor standards. In that spirit, we are including, in this statement, relevant information on U.S. labor law and practice as it relates to fundamental workers' rights.

United States Labor Law and Practice

101.            U.S. labor law is consistent with the principles underlying fundamental workers' rights.  For example, the U.S. Constitution assures the right of freedom of association.  National legislation, including the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) of 1935 and the Railway Labor Act of 1926, provides the right to organize and bargain collectively.  Section 7 of the NLRA guarantees that "[e]mployees shall have the right to self organization, to form, join or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing. ..."

102.            The Thirteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, ratified in 1865, provides that "[n]either slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction."  Implementing federal legislation prohibits forced or compulsory labor.

103.            The United States applies and seeks to enforce prohibitions against harmful child labor.  The United States has also ratified the ILO Worst Forms of Child Labor Convention (1999) (Convention 182).  The Fair Labor Standards Act prohibits "oppressive child labor" and the interstate transportation of products made with such labor.  Similarly, U.S. laws ‑ both Federal and State ‑ prohibit discrimination with respect to occupation and employment on the grounds of race, creed, national origin, or gender.  Such laws are vigorously enforced in both the public and private sectors to assure non‑discrimination at work.

(7)               Environmental Issues

104.            The United States believes that international trade, complemented by appropriate national environmental policies, can make an important contribution to environmental protection.  Such policies can serve this purpose by reducing market distortions that interfere with cost internalization;  helping governments generate the resources that they need to address environmental challenges;  and creating markets for environmental goods, services, and technologies.

105.            The United States has been quite active in the work of the WTO addressing the linkages between trade and environment policies, particularly with respect to the mandates set forth in paragraphs 31, 32, 33 and 51 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration.  This reflects our shared commitment to sustainable development, as reflected in the Preamble to the WTO Agreement.

106.            We believe it is important to identify and pursue areas where trade liberalization holds particular promise for yielding both trade and environmental benefits.  Three areas that hold such promise are the reduction or elimination of trade distorting measures in the agriculture sector, the elimination of subsidies that contribute to over‑fishing, and opening markets for environmental goods and services.

107.            The President's 2003 International Trade Agenda identifies several ways in which trade and environmental protection can be mutually reinforcing.  As a general matter, trade helps create the economic wealth needed to build and sustain support for improved environmental standards around the world.  Trade agreements are a means both to accelerate trade liberalization and to enhance the relationship between trade and effective environmental protection.  The Trade Act of 2002 provides guidance for pursuing environment objectives in the context of trade negotiations, and the United States has pursued such objectives across various fronts, particularly with respect to negotiations on free trade agreements.

108.            In addition to seeking commitments on levels of environmental protection and effective enforcement of environmental laws, the United States has sought to establish robust cooperative mechanisms in parallel with our free trade agreements to provide assistance to other countries in building their capacity to protect the environment and conserve natural resources.  Additionally, the United States has established an effective system of environmental reviews of trade negotiations and has increased the scope and rigor of such reviews since in recent years.  We have complemented these domestic actions with assistance to other countries as they consider how they can consider the environmental implications of trade agreements.

109.            More generally, we continue to think that it is vitally important that trade and environmental officials work together closely with respect to the agendas of both the WTO and international environmental fora.  We are committed to ensuring such coordination within the United States and believe it is important to the effective functioning of the WTO that all members ensure that such coordination takes place.

(8)               Agricultural Issues

110.            Domestic agricultural programs are governed until 2008 by the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 (commonly referred to as the 2002 Farm Bill), signed into law on May 13, 2002.  Its provisions support the production of a reliable, safe, and affordable supply of food and fiber;  promote stewardship of agricultural land and water resources;  facilitate access to American farm products at home and abroad;  encourage continued economic and infrastructure development in rural America;  and ensure continued research to maintain an efficient and innovative agricultural and food sector.

111.            Of particular relevance to U.S. trade obligations are the 2002 Farm Bill’s commodity provisions.  Income support for wheat, feed grains, upland cotton, rice, and oilseeds is provided through 3 programs:  direct payments, counter-cyclical payments, and marketing loans.  Support for peanuts is changed from a price support program with marketing quotas to a program with marketing loans, counter-cyclical payments, direct payments, and a quota buyout.  To the extent possible, the sugar program is to operate as a "no net cost" program.  A new dairy income support program is introduced.  Using the WTO classification system, direct payments are green box measures, counter-cyclical payments are non-product specific amber box measures, and marketing loans and sugar and dairy price supports are product-specific amber box measures.  The United States makes very limited use of the export subsidies allowed it under the Agreement on Agriculture, mainly for dairy products.

112.            The 2002 Farm Bill extends the two U.S. export subsidy programs:  The Dairy Export Incentive Program and the Export Enhancement Program (EEP).  However, the U.S. has made very little use of the export subsidy opportunities provided by these programs and allowed under the Agreement on Agriculture.  In the last few years, only dairy products have received export subsidies, EEP hasn’t been used since 2001.  At $31.6 million, average dairy export subsidies in 2001-2002 were roughly a quarter of the WTO ceiling amount.

113.            The Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) is the entity responsible for managing U.S. farm programs through loans, purchases, payments, and other operations. CCC total net direct payments in 2003 were $12.9 billion, a 35% decline from the average over 1999 and 2000.[3]  These net direct payments are notified as a mix of blue and green box measures.  CCC Commodity loan program net outlays–a significant component of U.S. amber box support–declined 32% over this period.  Trends in outlays, as well as the nature of new programs, suggest that the United States will continue to meet its Agreement on Agriculture domestic support obligations.  If the Secretary of Agriculture determines that the AMS ceiling will be exceeded, the 2002 Farm Bill has a provision by which the Secretary shall, to the maximum extent practicable, adjust expenditures to avoid exceeding allowable levels.  Before making any adjustments, the Secretary is required to submit a report to Congress on the adjustments to be made.

IV.              OPENNESS AND ACCOUNTABILITY:  BUILDING SUPPORT FOR TRADE

114.            Building support for trade among our diverse domestic constituencies and the international community is one of the most important challenges the WTO and its members face.  Improving the transparency and openness of both the WTO and our individual domestic processes, and ensuring that we hear the concerns of stakeholders are among the keys to meeting this challenge.  These issues are of great importance in the United States and are fundamental to the way our government operates and interacts with the American citizenry.  We think it important that other WTO Members know more about how our system works, as they consider how best to build support for trade in their own countries and as we collectively explore how to address the same issues for the WTO.

The U.S. System

115.            Consulting with those interested in and affected by issues is an important part of any government’s responsibility, and is a hallmark of the U.S. system.  Advice from stakeholders is both a critical and integral part of the trade policy process.  The United States government consults with interested parties on a regular basis through a variety of mechanisms, both formal and informal.

Soliciting Public Comment

116.            U.S. Government agencies regularly solicit public comment on trade issues.  The United States has notices in the Federal Register seeking public comment on the mandated negotiations on agriculture, services, and the priorities for future market access negotiations on industrial goods[4], institutional improvements to the WTO particularly with respect to the transparency of its operations and outreach,[5] and the DDA negotiations and the agenda in the World Trade Organization.[6]

Advisory Committee Process

117.            The U.S. Congress established the private sector advisory committee system in 1974 to ensure that U.S. trade policy and trade negotiation objectives adequately reflect U.S. commercial and economic interests.  Congress expanded and enhanced the role and objectives of this system in three subsequent Trade Acts.  This system is arranged in three tiers:  the President’s Advisory Committee for Trade Policy and Negotiations (ACTPN);  seven policy advisory committees;  and 25 technical, sectoral, and functional advisory committees.  As trade has developed and broadened, the composition of these official bodies has grown to better reflect society’s interests in the trading system.

118.            The President appoints up to 45 ACTPN members for two‑year terms;  membership must broadly represent key economic sectors affected by trade.  The committee considers trade policy issues in the context of the overall national interest.  Representatives are drawn from the agriculture, business, labor, environmental, and consumer communities.

119.            The policy advisory committees are the Intergovernmental Policy Advisory Committee (IGPAC), Trade Advisory Committee on Africa (TACA), Agricultural Policy Advisory Committee (APAC), Labor Advisory Committee (LAC), Defense Policy Advisory Committee on Trade (DPACT), and Trade and Environment Policy Advisory Committee (TEPAC).  Each committee provides advice based upon the perspective of its specific sector or area.

120.            Finally the 26 sectoral, functional, and technical advisory committees are organized in two areas:  industry and agriculture.  Each sectoral or technical committee represents a specific sector or commodity group (such as textiles or dairy products) and provides specific technical advice concerning the effect that trade policy decisions may have on its sector.  The functional advisory committees provide cross‑sectoral advice on customs matters and trade facilitation, standards and technical barriers to trade, intellectual property rights.

121.            The 22 industry sectoral and functional committees jointly administered by USTR and the U.S. Department of Commerce recently have been restructured to create 17 Industry Trade Advisory Committees (ITACs), including the Committee of Chairs of the ITACs, to ensure these committees reflect today’s U.S. economy and vision for the future.  The restructuring is consistent with recommendations in a recent U.S. General Accounting Office Report, “International Trade:  Advisory Committee System Should be Updated to Better Serve U.S. Policy Needs” (GAO-02-876), and reflects the commitment of Commerce and USTR to improve the trade advisory committee system.

122.            The Trade Act of 2002 requires these committees to prepare reports on proposed trade agreements subject to Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) for the USTR, the President, and the Congress, assessing the expected effects of the trade agreement on the particular sectors.  These reports are made public on USTR's website at www.ustr.gov.

V.                 LOOKING FORWARD

123.            Pursuit of trade liberalization continues to be at the forefront of U.S. international economic policy.  The GATT/ WTO has had a powerful and positive impact on trade over the past half century and the Doha Development Agenda of the WTO continues to hold the greatest potential for catalyzing global economic growth through further trade liberalization.  As has always been true of the GATT/WTO, the extent of liberalization – and to a large degree the distribution of the benefits of that liberalization – depends on the participation by each of the WTO Members.  In the DDA, the United States will continue to work towards an ambitious conclusion to the Round in order to reduce poverty and raise living standards across the globe.  Expanding market access in the three key sectors of the international economy:  industrial and consumer goods, agricultural products and services will yield the greatest impact on trade flows, thereby reducing poverty and raising living standards.  An ambitious result in market access will be the greatest legacy of our work in the DDA.

124.            The President’s 2003 Trade Agenda also calls for advancing free trade through regional and bilateral agreements with our trading partners.  Our aim in all of the negotiations for new agreements is comprehensive trade coverage, innovative and strengthened disciplines on trade and consistency with our WTO obligations.  Trade ministers in Miami, Florida recently reaffirmed their commitment to the FTAA’s comprehensive agenda.  In the coming year, FTAA negotiations will continue on a common and balanced set of rights and obligations applicable to all in nine negotiating disciplines.  CAFTA negotiations are expected to be completed in the near future, and the United States looks to broaden application of CAFTA disciplines next year to include the Dominican Republic.  The United States will pursue comprehensive trade coverage in negotiations on our other regional and bilateral agreements in 2004 and beyond.

125.            The United States will encourage increased trade with many developing countries through our preferential trade measures, such as the Generalized System of Preferences, the African Growth and Opportunity Act, the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act, and the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act.  The United States will also continue its commitment to increasing trade capacity in developing countries.

126.            By undertaking these various elements – forging global, regional, and bilateral trade agreements;  encouraging developing countries’ multilateral integration;  building support for open trade;  encouraging sustainable development and core labor standards;  and fostering greater transparency – the United States will continue to play its traditional leadership role in promoting trade liberalization and developing a trading system of benefit to all.

ANNEX 1

U.S. SUBMISSIONS TO THE WTO IN SUPPORT

OF THE DOHA DEVELOPMENT AGENDA

 

Committee on Agriculture, Special Session

·         Export Competition, Market Access & Domestic Support (JOB(02)/122)

 

Council on Trade in Services, Special Session

·         Modalities for the Special Treatment For Least-Developed Country Members in the Negotiations on Trade In Services – JOB (03)/133

·         US Government Points of Contact in Least-Developed Country Members – JOB (03)/33

·         Small and Medium Sized Enterprises (TN/S/W/5)

·         Initial Offer (TN/S/O/USA)

·         An Assessment of Services Trade and Liberalization in the United States and Developing Economies (TN/S/W/12)

 

Negotiating Group on Market Access

·         Tariffs & Trade Data Needs Assessment (TN/MA/W/2)

·         Environmental Goods (TN/MA/W/3)

·         Modalities Proposal (TN/MA/W/18)

·         Proposal on modalities for addressing Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs) (TN/MA/W/18/Add.1)

·         Revenue Implications of Trade Liberalization (TN/MA/W/18/Add.2)

·         Vertical NTB Modality (TN/MA/W/18/Add.3)

·         Contribution on an Environmental Goods Modality (TN/TE/W/38) & (TN/MA/W/18/Add.5)

·         Liberalizing Environmental Goods In The WTO:  Approaching The Definition Issue (TN/TE/W/34) & (TN/MA/W/18/Add.4)

·         Non-Agricultural Market Access:  Modalities (TN/MA/W/44)

         Joint communication from the United States, Canada, and the EU

 

Negotiating Group on Rules

·         Fisheries Subsidies (TN/RL/W/3)

Joint communication from the United States, Australia, Chile, Ecuador, Iceland, New Zealand, Peru, and the Philippines

·         Fisheries Subsidies (TN/RL/W/21)

·         OECD Steel Paper (TN/RL/W/24)

·         Questions on Papers Submitted to Rules Negotiating Group (TN/RL/W/25)

·         Basic Concepts of the Trade Remedies Rules (TN/RL/W/27)

·         Special and Differential Treatment and the Subsidies Agreement (TN/RL/W/33)

·         Second Set of Questions from the United States on Papers Submitted to the Rules Negotiating Group (TN/RL/W/34)

·         Investigatory Procedures Under The Antidumping and Subsidies Agreements (TN/RL/W/35)

·         Communication From The United States Attaching A Communiqué From The Organization For Economic Cooperation And Development (OECD) (TN/RL/W/49)

·         Circumvention (TN/RL/W/50)

·         Replies To Questions Presented To The United States On Submission TN/Rl/W/27 (TN/RL/W/53)

·         Third Set Of Questions From The United States On Papers Submitted To The Rules Negotiating Group (TN/RL/W/54)

·         Responses By The United States To Questions From Australia On Investigatory Procedures Under The Anti-Dumping And Subsidies Agreements (TN/RL/W/71)

·         Identification Of Certain Major Issues Under The Anti-Dumping And Subsidies Agreements (TN/RL/W/72)

·         Possible Approaches To Improved Disciplines On Fisheries Subsidies (TN/RL/W/77)

·         Subsidies Disciplines Requiring Clarification And Improvement (TN/RL/W/78)

·         Elements Of A Steel Subsidies Agreement  (TN/RL/W/95)

·         Identification of Additional Issues under the Anti-dumping and Subsidies Agreements (TN/RL/W/98)

·         Fourth Set Of Questions From The United States On Papers Submitted To The Rules Negotiating Group (TN/RL/W/103)

·         Further Issues Identified Under The Anti-Dumping And Subsidies Agreements For Discussion By the Negotiating Group On Rules (TN/RL/W/130)

 

Committee on Antidumping Practices

·         Proposal for Operationalization of Art. 15 (G/ADP/AHG/W/138)

·         Draft Recommendation on Operationalizing Art. 15 (G/ADP/AHG/W/143)

·         Para. 7.4:  Annual Reviews of the Antidumping Agreement (G/ADP/W/427)

 

Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures

 

·         Approval of Qualifying Requests under SCM Article. 27.4 (G/SCM/W/521)

                  Joint communication from the United States, Australia, Canada, the EU, Japan and

                  Switzerland

 

Dispute Settlement Body, Special Session

·         Contribution of the United States to the Improvement of the Dispute Settlement Understanding of the WTO-Related to Transparency (TN/DS/W/13)

·         Negotiations on Improvements And Clarifications of the Dispute Settlement Understanding on Improving Flexibility and Member Control in WTO Dispute Settlement (TN/DS/W/28)

Joint communication from United States and Chile

 

·         Further Contribution of The United States to The Improvement of The Dispute Settlement Understanding of the WTO Related to Transparency  – suggested text (TN/DS/W/46)

·         Negotiations on Improvements and Clarifications of the Dispute Settlement Understanding on Improving Flexibility and Member Control in WTO Dispute Settlement – suggested text (TN/DS/W/52)

Joint communication from United States and Chile

 

Committee on Trade and Environment, Regular and Special Session

·         Para. 31 (ii) WTO - Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs) Co-operation  (TN/TE/W/5)

·         Para. 31 (iii) Environmental Goods (TN/TE/W/8)

·         Para. 31 (i) Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs)  (TN/TE/W/20)

·         Paragraph 33 of the Doha Declaration (WT/CTE/W/227)

 

(Dual submissions on Environmental Goods are listed under the Negotiating Group on Market Access)

Council on TRIPS, Regular & Special Session

·         Proposal on GIs for Wine & Spirits (TN/IP/W/6)

·         Questions and Answers:  Comparison of Proposals (TN/IP/W/1)

·         Issues for Discussion, Article 23.4 (TN/IP/W/2)

·         Second submission on TRIPS & Public Health, Paragraph.6 (IP/C/W/358)

·         Implications of Article 23 Extension (IP/C/W/386)

·         Moratorium to Address Needs of Developing and Least-Developed Members With No or Insufficient Manufacturing Capacities in the Pharmaceutical Sector (IP/C/W/396)

 

Committee on Trade and Development, Special Session

·         Remarks on the review of Special and Differential Treatment (TN/CTD/W/9)

·         Monitoring Mechanism (TN/CTD/W/19)

·         Approach to Agreement-Specific Proposals  (TN/CTD/W/27)

 

Working Group on Transparency in Government Procurement

·         Capacity Building Questions (WT/WGTGP/W/34)

·         Workplan Proposal (WT/WGTGP/W/35)

·         Considerations Related to Enforcement of an Agreement on Transparency in Government Procurement (WT/WGTGP/W/38)

 

Trade Facilitation

·         Article VIII - Fees and Formalities (G/C/W/384)

·         Article X - Publication and Administration (G/C/W/400)

·         Integrated and Comprehensive Approach to Special and Differential Treatment (G/C/W/451)

 

Work Program on Electronic Commerce

·         Work Program on Electronic Commerce (WT/GC/W/493/Rev.1)

 

Working Group on the Relationship between Trade and Investment

·         Covering FDI & Portfolio Investment in an Agreement (WT/WGTI/W/142)

 

I.       Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and        Competition Policy

·         Technical Assistance (WT/WGTCP/W/185)

·         Hardcore Cartels (WT/WGTCP/W/203)

·         Voluntary Cooperation (WT/WGTCP/W/204)

·         Transparency & Non-discrimination (WT/WGTCP/W/218)

·         Procedural Fairness (WT/WGTCP/W/219)

·         The Benefits of Peer Review in the WTO Competition Context (WT/WGTCP/W/233)

 

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